Is perception a propositional attitude?

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 59, Issue 236, 2009, Pages 452-469

  Crane, Tim ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 75949122910     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: 14679213     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.608.x     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. For a classic discussion, see F.I. Dretske, Seeing and Knowing (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969)
2. A. Byrne, 'Perception and Conceptual Content', in E. Sosa and M. Steup (eds), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 231-50, at p. 232
3. For some statements of this view, see J. Searle, Intentionality (Cambridge UP, 1983), ch. 3
4. C. Peacocke, Sense and Content (Oxford UP, 1983), ch. 1
5. M. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness (MIT Press, 1995)
6. M. Thau, Consciousness and Cognition (Oxford UP, 2002)
7. J. McDowell, Mind and World (Harvard UP, 1994), p. 26
8. Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint [1874], ed. L. McAlister (London: Rout-ledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, repr. London: Routledge, 1995), p. 88
9. I follow Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (MIT Press, 1992), p. 131, in this use of the word 'aspect'
10. for more details see T. Crane, Elements of Mind (Oxford UP, 2001), §6
11. But see K. Farkas, The Subject's Point of View (Oxford UP, 2008), ch. 7
12. The idea derives from Husserl, Logical Investigations [1901], tr. J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge, 1970), No.V, ch. 2
13. For non-representational views of experience, see B. Brewer, 'Perception and Content', European Journal of Philosophy, 14 (2006), pp. 165-81
14. C. Travis, 'The Silence of the Senses', Mind, 113 (2004), pp. 57-94
15. J. Campbell, Reference and Consciousness (Oxford UP, 2003). Brewer explicitly rejects the use of the word 'content' in the theory of perception
16. See S. Siegel, 'The Contents of Perception', in E.N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ perception-contents
17. D.M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Routledge 1968)
18. McDowell, Mind and World (Harvard UP, 1994), p. 36
19. Pace J. Westerhoff, 'Logical Relations between Pictures', Journal of Philosophy, 102 (2005), pp. 603-23
20. Z.G. Szabó, 'Believing in Things', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66 (2003), pp. 584-611
21. Byrne, 'Perception and Conceptual Content', in E. Sosa and M. Steup (eds), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 231-50
22. cf. D. Stoljar, 'The Argument from Diaphanousness', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp. Vol. 30 (2004), pp. 341-90
23. Thau, Consciousness and Cognition
24. McDowell, 'Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge', Proceedings of the British Academy, 68 (1982), pp. 455-79
25. R. Heck, 'Non-Conceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons"', Philosophical Review, 109 (2000), pp. 483-523
26. See T. Crane, 'The Non-Conceptual Content of Experience', in T. Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience (Cambridge UP, 1992), pp. 136-57
27. and 'Content, Non-Conceptual', in E.J. Craig (ed.), Encylopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998)
28. G. Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford UP, 1982)
29. I am especially indebted here to Ian Phillips
30. Peacocke, 'Scenarios, Concepts and Perception', in Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience, pp. 105-35
31. For a discussion of Peacocke, see J.L. Bermúdez, 'The Sources of Self-Consciousness', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 102 (2001), pp. 87-107
32. Thanks to an anonymous referee, and to Alex Byrne, Katalin Farkas, James Genone, Hannah Ginsborg, John MacFarlane, Ian Phillips, Murali Ramachandran, Dan Zahavi, and audiences in Berkeley, Copenhagen, Glasgow, Sussex and Zagreb. Special thanks to Susanna Siegel for her detailed and penetrating written comments; I am sure my answers have not satisfied her. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the EU NEST project REFCOM