Buying private data without verification

EC 2014 - Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Volumn , Issue , 2014, Pages 931-948

  Ghosh, Arpita ^a   Ligett, Katrina ^b   Roth, Aaron ^c   Schoenebeck, Grant ^d  

^a Cornell University ^*  (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

differential privacy; mechanism design; peer prediction

Indexed keywords

AGGREGATES; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; COSTS; MACHINE DESIGN; SURVEYS;

ACCURATE ESTIMATION; BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUM; DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACIES; MARGINAL DISTRIBUTION; MECHANISM DESIGN; PRIOR DISTRIBUTION; PRIVATE DATA; SENSITIVE INFORMATIONS;

POPULATION STATISTICS;

EID: 84903172200     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2600057.2602902     Document Type: Conference Paper

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