Minimum payments that reward honest reputation feedback

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 190-199

  Jurca, Radu ^a   Faltings, Boi ^a  

^a EPFL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Honest feedback; Mechanism design; Reputation mechanisms

Indexed keywords

COST EFFECTIVENESS; OPTIMIZATION; PROBLEM SOLVING; PROFESSIONAL ASPECTS;

HONEST FEEDBACK; MECHANISM DESIGN; REPUTATION MECHANISMS;

ONLINE SYSTEMS;

EID: 33748689527     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1134707.1134728     Document Type: Conference Paper

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