Incentives for expressing opinions in online polls

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 119-128

  Jurca, Radu ^a   Faltings, Boi ^b  

^a GOOGLE   (Switzerland)

^b EPFL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Incentive compatibility; Mechanism design; Opinion polls

Indexed keywords

APRIORI; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; INTEREST RATES; NEW MECHANISMS; ON-LINE OPINIONS; OPINION POLLS; PREDICTION MARKETS; PRIVATE INFORMATION;

ELECTRIC CONDUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MACHINE DESIGN;

SURVEYS;

EID: 58849114322     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1386790.1386812     Document Type: Conference Paper

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