Approximately optimal auctions for selling privacy when costs are correlated with data

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 568-585

  Fleischer, Lisa K ^a   Lyu, Yu Han ^a  

^a Dartmouth Department of Computer Science_Dartmouth College   (United States)

Author keywords

differential privacy; mechanism design

Indexed keywords

DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACIES; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; MECHANISM DESIGN; OPTIMAL AUCTION; PRIVACY PRESERVING; SENSITIVE DATAS;

COSTS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; ESTIMATION; MACHINE DESIGN;

DATA PRIVACY;

EID: 84863535268     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2229012.2229054     Document Type: Conference Paper

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