Mechanisms for making crowds truthful

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Volumn 34, Issue , 2009, Pages 209-253

  Jurca, Radu ^a   Faltings, Boi ^b  

^a GOOGLE   (Switzerland)

^b EPFL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING;

ADVERSE SELECTION; COLLUSION RESISTANT; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; LARGE GROUPS; NASH EQUILIBRIA; ONLINE FEEDBACK; RATIONAL AGENTS; SELF-INTERESTED AGENTS;

RISK MANAGEMENT;

EID: 65349154613     PISSN: None     EISSN: 10769757     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1613/jair.2621     Document Type: Article

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