Robust incentive-compatible feedback payments

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4452 LNAI, Issue , 2007, Pages 204-218

  Jurca, Radu ^a   Faltings, Boi ^a  

^a EPFL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CORRELATION METHODS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; FEEDBACK; ONLINE SYSTEMS; OPTIMIZATION; ROBUST CONTROL;

INCENTIVES; PAYMENT SCHEMES; POTENTIAL GAINS;

EARNINGS;

EID: 37249031113     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-72502-2_15     Document Type: Conference Paper

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