Privacy and coordination: Computing on databases with endogenous participation

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 543-560

  Ghosh, Arpita ^a   Ligett, Katrina ^b  

^a Social Dynamics Laboratory   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Database privacy; Differential privacy

Indexed keywords

DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACIES; NOISE LEVELS; POPULATION SIZES; PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS; THRESHOLD STRATEGY;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; POPULATION STATISTICS;

DATABASE SYSTEMS;

EID: 84879778250     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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