Selling privacy at auction

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 91, Issue , 2015, Pages 334-346

  Ghosh, Arpita ^a   Roth, Aaron ^b  

^a Social Dynamics Laboratory   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Mechanism design; Privacy

Indexed keywords

EID: 84937975357     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.013     Document Type: Article

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