Microfoundations of the rule of law

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 17, Issue , 2014, Pages 21-42

  Hadfield, Gillian K ^a   Weingast, Barry R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Coordination; Democracy; Economic development; Institutions; Legal order

Indexed keywords

EID: 84901041805     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135226     Document Type: Article

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