The levers of legal design: Institutional determinants of the quality of law

Journal of Comparative Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 43-73

  Hadfield, Gillian K ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Civil code; Common law; Comparative law; Evolution of law; Institutions; Legal origins

Indexed keywords

EID: 40649112573     PISSN: 01475967     EISSN: 10957227     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2007.10.002     Document Type: Article

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