Do Norms Count? State Regulation and Compliance in a Norwegian Fishing Community

Acta Sociologica

Volumn 45, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 305-314

  Gezelius, Stig S ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE OF BIOECONOMY RESEARCH   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036959232     PISSN: 00016993     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/000169930204500404     Document Type: Article

References (46)

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