The rule of law and economic development

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 11, Issue , 2008, Pages 205-234

  Haggard, Stephan ^a   MacIntyre, Andrew ^b   Tiede, Lydia ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Contracts; Corruption; Governance; Legal origins; Long run growth; Property rights

Indexed keywords

EID: 47549117972     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.081205.100244     Document Type: Article

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