Reputation and status as motives for war

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 17, Issue , 2014, Pages 371-393

  Dafoe, Allan ^a   Renshon, Jonathan ^b   Huth, Paul ^c  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Audience costs; Beliefs; Deterrence; Honor; Inference; Prestige; Resolve

Indexed keywords

EID: 84901007223     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421     Document Type: Article

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