The common priors assumption: A comment on "bargaining and the nature of war"

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 607-613

  Fey, Mark ^a   Ramsay, Kristopher W ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Common priors; War

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745804949     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: 15528766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002706289182     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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4. Geanakoplos, John, and Heraklis M. Polemarchakis. 1982. We can't disagree forever. Journal of Economic Theory 28 (2). 192-200.
5. Lipman, Barton L. 2003. Finite order implications of common priors. Mimeo, Boston University.
6. Morris, Stephen. 1995. The common prior assumption in economic theory. Economics and Philosophy 11 (2). 227-253.
7. Rubinstein, Ariel. 1998. Modeling bounded rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
8. Sebenius, James K., and John Geanakoplos. 1983. Don't bet on it: Contingent agreements with asymmetric information. Journal of the American Statistical Association 78 (382). 424-426.
9. Smith, Alastair, and Allan C. Stam. 2004. Bargaining and the nature of war. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (6). 783-813.