After unipolarity: China's visions of international order in an era of U.S. Decline

International Security

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 41-72

  Schweller, Randall L ^a   Pu, Xiaoyu ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052293914     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/ISEC_a_00044     Document Type: Article

References (214)

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10. Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008).
11. Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51.
12. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56.
13. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79.
14. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the ColdWar," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41.
15. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008).
16. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 2008).
17. Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), pp. 7-41.
18. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), chap. 10.
19. See David A. Lake, "Beneath the Commerce of Nations: A Theory of International Economic Structures," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (June 1984), pp. 143-170.
20. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 197-209.
21. Gilpin's theory is related to but not the same as power transition theory.
22. The classic statements of power transition are A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958).
23. A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
24. See also Ronald L. Tammen, Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Allan C. Stam III, Mark Abdollahian, Carole Alsharabati, Brian Efird, and A.F.K. Organski, Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (New York: Chatham House, 2000).
25. Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy, "The Power Transition Research Program: A Lakatosian Analysis," in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 109-157.
26. Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
27. Woosang Kim and James D. Morrow, "When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?" American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 4 (November 1992), pp. 896-922.
28. Douglas Lemke and William Reed, "Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations: Power Transition Theory and the Democratic Peace," International Interactions, Vol. 22, No. 2 (October 1996), pp. 143-164.
29. Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence (San Francisco, Calif.: W.H. Freeman, 1975), p. 28.
30. Without considering international legitimacy, realist theory should assume that the hegemon and rising powers are equally threatening to each other. Kenneth N. Waltz himself emphasizes that the hegemon can appear more threatening than the rising power.
31. See Waltz, Realism and International Politics (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. xiii.
32. The legitimacy gap between the hegemon and rising power often accounts for why the latter appears more threatening than the former. Currently, the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony is widely recognized, whereas the status of a potential peer competitor is unconsolidated and uncertain.
33. For the strategy of delegitimation, see Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), pp. 160-178.
34. For similar cyclical patterns of international politics, see George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 1978), pp. 214-235.
35. George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Economics and Politics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996).
36. There are many ways to measure "revisionism" in international relations. Some scholars argue that the hegemon itself can be revisionist if it breaks the rules of its own global order or does not follow prevailing international norms, or both.
37. See Robert Jervis, "The Remaking of a Unipolar World," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Summer 2006), pp. 7-19.
38. Ian Hurd, "Breaking and Making Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy," International Politics, Vol. 44, Nos. 2-3 (March 2007), pp. 194-213.
39. For more on the distinctions between revisionist and status quo states and their associated behaviors, see Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), p. 56.
40. Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
41. Jason W. Davidson, The Origins of Revisionist and Status-quo States (New York: Palgrave, 2006).
42. For many observers, the Georgia conflict indicates that Russia is taking a more confrontational approach to the U.S.-led order. In contrast, China's "peaceful rise" or "peaceful development" strategy emphasizes accommodation with the West.
43. For analysis of the Russian challenge, see Stephen Sestanovich, "What Has Moscow Done? Rebuilding U.S.-Russian Relations," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 6 (November/December 2008), pp. 12-28.
44. Of course, Russia is a great power in decline, having been reduced to little more than a petro-state. China, on the other hand, though not yet a peer competitor of the United States, is a comprehensive rising power with a complete portfolio of great power capabilities.
45. For the most comprehensive analysis of the structural hurdles to balancing under unipolarity, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010).
46. Compared with other systems, unipolarity is the most dangerous structural condition for China's rise, which partly explains why China has pursued a reassurance strategy since the end of the Cold War.
47. See Jia Qingguo, "Danji Shijie yu Zhongguo de Heping Fazhan [Unipolarity and China's peaceful development]," International Politics Quarterly (Beijing), No. 4 (November 2007), pp. 51-64.
48. For an overview of China's grand strategy, see Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005).
49. See, for example, George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987).
50. George Modelski, ed., Exploring Long Cycles (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1987).
51. Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, "Global War and the Political Economy of Structural Change," in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies, Vol. 2 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), p. 315.
52. Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics.
53. In terms of timing, our notion of a delegitimation/deconcentration phase is closer to that of the "challenge" phase offered by Brian M. Pollins and Kevin P. Murrin: "'Challenge' is a time in which rising new powers begin to take issue with the existing order. This is followed by a period of jockeying among contenders, a period we label 'Balancing,' to reflect the important alliance dynamics of this time.".
54. Pollins and Murrin, "Where Hobbes Meets Hobson: Core Conflict and Colonialism, 1495-1985," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 3 (September 1999), p. 433.
55. James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 138.
56. As Scott puts it, "Relations of dominations are, at the same time, relations of resistance."
57. James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985), p. xv.
58. Scott writes, "It is possible and common for human actors to conceive of a line of action, that is, at the moment, either impractical or impossible. Thus a person may dream of a revenge or a millennial kingdom of justice that may never occur. On the other hand, as circumstances change, it may become possible to act on those dreams.".
59. What we are calling "cost-imposing" strategies others have called "soft balancing.".
60. See Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Primacy and Its Discontents: American Power and International Stability (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009).
61. For example, Israel said that it would dismantle its settlements in the occupied territories but did so very slowly while expanding others without notifying the United States.
62. An example is Turkey's refusal to give the United States access to its bases prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
63. A Chinese blockade of Taiwan's trade through the destruction of ports or shipping would be an example of this behavior.
64. Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1 (January/February 1996), pp. 33-51.
65. Scott, Weapons of the Weak.
66. Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
67. See also Martha Finnemore, "Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be," World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January 2009), pp. 58-85.
68. In domestic and transnational contexts, nonviolent resistance is a forceful alternative to violence that can pose effective challenges to opponents; indeed, nonviolent resistance is sometimes more effective than violent resistance.
69. See Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008), pp. 7-44.
70. See David Edelstein and M. Taylor Fravel, "Life on the Great Power Frontier: Capabilities, Influence, and Trajectory in China's Rise," unpublished manuscript, Georgetown University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010.
71. This is also similar to the notion of "reformist revisionist" proposed in Barry Buzan, "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?" Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2010), p. 14.
72. Contrary to standard notions of hegemony and false consciousness, (1) most subordinate actors (whether classes, racial minorities, or weak states) can "penetrate and demystify the prevailing ideology"; (2) inevitability is not seen as implying legitimacy; and (3) hegemonic ideologies inherently beget contestation, because they "represent an idealization which creates the contradictions that permit it to be criticized in its own terms." Scott, Weapons of the Weak, pp. 317-318.
73. See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
74. Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).
75. For these two assumptions, see O'Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, pp. 2, 15-24.
76. Imperial Germany's demand for its rightful "place in the sun" is an example of this type of grievance. Germany did not seek an overthrow of the rules of the system, but a modification of the division of territory that reflected Germany's dramatic gains in economic and military capabilities relative to the more established powers.
77. See Kevin J. O'Brien, "Rightful Resistance," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 1 (October 1996), pp. 48-51.
78. This is consistent with the arguments made in G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).
79. Rising powers often fantasize about world order, and in this sense contemporary China is not a unique case.
80. See, for instance, Liu Mingfu, Zhongguo Meng: Hou Meiguo Shidai de DaGuo Siwei yu Zhanlüe Dingwei [China's dream: Major power thinking and strategic posture in a post-American era] (Beijing: China Friendship Publishing Company, 2010).
81. It should be noted that Liu's book is controversial in China.
82. Although our argument about the indeterminacy of China's intentions contradicts Iain Johnston's claim that China is presently a status quo power, Johnston admits that although he detects a "decline in the level and scope of revisionist interest in China's overall diplomacy," this "trend [could] reverse in the future.".
83. Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" p. 56.
84. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 138.
85. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1991).
86. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004).
87. Jiang Zemin's report to the Sixteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, quoted in Pan Zhongqi, "Change of International Security Order and China's Period of Important Strategic Opportunities," in Shanghai Institute for International Studies, ed., China and Asia's Security (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, 2005), p. 79.
88. Thomas J. Christensen, "Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia," International Security, Vol. 31, No.1 (Summer 2006), pp. 81-126.
89. Thomas J. Christensen, "Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent Lessons for the Obama Administration," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3 (July 2009), pp. 89-104.
90. Wang Jisi, "China's Search for Stability with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5 (September/October 2005), p. 44.
91. See David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), p. 2.
92. China does not need to match U.S. military power to pose problems and achieve its own limited political objectives.
93. See Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5-40.
94. David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 64-99.
95. According to Chinese strategist Yan Xuetong, the priority of China's diplomacy is to increase the capability of agenda setting in international institutions, not to satisfy the demands of the U.S.-led international community.
96. See "Xuyan" [preface], in Yan Xuetong and Sun Xuefeng, Zhongguo Jueqi Jiqi Zhanlue [The rise of China and its strategy] (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005), p. 5.
97. Chinese leaders emphasize that WTO membership was primarily a political issue rather than a purely economic issue.
98. See Li Peng, Li Peng Waishi Riji [Foreign affairs diary of Li Peng] (Beijing: Xinhua, 2008), p. 806.
99. Quoted in C. Fred Bergsten, "A Partnership of Equals: How Washington Should Respond to China's Economic Challenge," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4 (July/August 2008), pp. 57-69, at p. 65.
100. For China's proposals during the Group of Twenty summit on the international financial crisis, see "Hu Urges Revamp of Finance System," China Daily, November 17, 2008.
101. Daniel W. Drezner, "U.S. Debt to China: Implications and Repercussions," testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 111th Cong., 2d sess., February 25, 2010.
102. Daniel W. Drezner, "Bad Debts: Assessing China's Financial Influence in Great Power Politics," International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2009), pp. 7-45.
103. More specifically, Zhou Xiaochuan proposed that the dollar be replaced as the world's reserve currency by special drawing rights.
104. See Jamil Anderlini, "China Calls for New Reserve Currency," Financial Times, March 24, 2009.
105. See Paul Krugman, "China's Dollar Trap," New York Times, April 2, 2009.
106. Yu Yongding, "Zhongguo Shenxian Meiyuan Xianjing" [China is deeply trapped by U.S. dollars], Di Yi Caijin Ribao, May 31, 2010.
107. Whether China can succeed in challenging the dominant status of the U.S. dollar is debatable.
108. For a systematic examination of the dollar's status, see Eric Helleiner and Jonathan Kirshner, eds., The Future of the Dollar (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009).
109. Stephen S. Cohen and J. Bradford DeLong, The End of Influence: What Happens When Other Countries Have the Money (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
110. For the impracticalities of the proposal, see Barry Eichengreen, "The Dollar Dilemma: The World's Top Currency Faces Competition," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 5 (September/October 2009), pp. 61-63.
111. For the Chiang Mai Initiative, see Drezner, "U.S. Debt to China.".
112. Most of the literature focuses on how China is "socialized" or "integrated" into the existing international society.
113. See, for example, Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007).
114. In contrast, the other side of the story-how China might influence the evolution of norms in international institutions-has been relatively undertheorized, probably because this is a relatively new face of China's foreign policy. "Socialization," however, is typically understood as a two-way process: people are not only the targets of socialization but are also active agents who influence the content and outcomes of the process.
115. See Kent L. Sandstrom, Daniel D. Martin, and Gary Alan Fine, Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality: A Symbolic Interactionist Approach to Social Psychology and Sociology (Los Angeles, Calif.: Roxbury, 2002), pp. 65-66.
116. Guo Shuyong, Daguo Chengzhang de Luoji: Xifang Daguo Jueqi de Guojizhengzhi Shehuixue fenxi [The logic of the great power growth: A study of the rise of Western powers from the perspective of international political sociology] (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2006).
117. For the discussion of legitimate wars and the rise of China, see Guo Shuyong, "Legitimacy, War, and the Rise of China: An International Political Sociology Perspective," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring 2007), pp. 47-77, at p. 47.
118. Stefan Stähle, "China's Shifting Attitude towards United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," China Quarterly, Vol. 195 (September 2008), pp. 631-655.
119. Richard Gowan and Franziska Brantner, "A Global Force for Human Rights? An Audit of European Power at the UN," Policy Paper (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008), http://ecfr.3cdn.net/3a4f39da1b34463d16_tom6b928f.pdf.
120. Soft power "rests on the ability to shape the preference of others," according to Joseph Nye. "It is leading by example and attracting others to do what you want.".
121. Nye, Soft Power, pp. 5-6.
122. It is not necessarily true that every dimension of China's soft power diplomacy will become part of a zero-sum game with the United States. In some situations, China's increasing soft power might create opportunities for U.S.-Chinese cooperation.
123. See Christensen, "Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?" pp. 81-84.
124. Moreover, China confronts significant barriers in its promotion of soft power.
125. See Yanzhong Huang and Sheng Ding, "The Dragon's Underbelly: An Analysis of China's Soft Power," East Asia, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter 2006), pp. 22-44.
126. Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 6.
127. "Even if the People's Republic had done nothing in the world, the power of the Chinese example would have presented a major challenge to promoters of democracy," writes Mark Leonard.
128. Leonard, What Does China Think? (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), p. 124.
129. Bruce W. Jentleson and Steven Weber, "America's Hard Sell," Foreign Policy, No. 169 (November/December 2008), pp. 43-49, at p. 43.
130. See Stewart Patrick, "Irresponsible Stakeholders? The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6 (November/December 2010), pp. 44-53.
131. Jentleson and Weber, "America's Hard Sell," pp. 46-47.
132. Thomas J. Christensen, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Robert S. Ross, "Conclusions and Future Directions," in Johnston and Ross, eds., New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 380.
133. William A. Callahan's analysis of emerging Chinese visions of world order is insightful but limited, focusing on only one particular Chinese scholar, Zhao Tingyang. Although Zhao's philosophical thinking informs debates among some Chinese international relations experts, Zhao is also heavily criticized in China.
134. See Callahan, "Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?" International Studies Review, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December 2008), pp. 749-761.
135. Chinese visions of international order partly depend on the uncertain prospect of its domestic politics, of which there is a parallel debate (e.g., democracy vs. resilient authoritarianism).
136. For overviews of this debate, see Daniel C. Lynch, "Envisioning China's Political Future: Elite Reponses to Democracy as a Global Constitutive Norm," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 3 (September 2007), pp. 701-722.
137. David Shambaugh, China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), chap. 8.
138. We do not claim that any particular Chinese vision is accurate or unrealistic. Instead, we present what the Chinese think the future international order would look like from their perspective. Whether these Chinese visions are logically coherent (or historically accurate) is not our major concern here.
139. Beijing's strategies may shift as China continues to grow. The various strategies during different rising periods (early period vs. late period of rising) have been identified by several scholars.
140. See Edelstein and Fravel, "Life on the Great Power Frontier".
141. Yan and Sun, Zhongguo Jueqi Jiqi Zhanlue, pp. 13-15.
142. Sheena Chestnut and Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China Rising?" in Eva Paus, Penelope B. Prime, and Jon Western, eds., Global Giant: Is China Changing the Rules of the Game? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2009), pp. 237-260.
143. The four dimensions are adapted from Jentleson and Weber, "America's Hard Sell.".
144. A similar trend is also occurring in China's thinking about its domestic political future.
145. See Lynch, "Envisioning China's Political Future," p. 718.
146. Yong Deng, China's Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 53-54.
147. Again, we emphasize that Chinese revisionist alternatives to the current order are still embryonic and contested at this point. For example, Zhao Tingyang's Tianxia philosophy and Liu Mingfu's book, China's Dream, are controversial and hotly debated in China. Some argue, however, that China is already pursuing a spoiler strategy and that China's challenge is increasingly an ideational one.
148. See, for example, Edward Friedman, "Appeasing a Rising Authoritarian China: Implications for Democracy and Peace," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, New York, February 15, 2009.
149. Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-first Century (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
150. For a counterargument, see Edward S. Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why China's Rise Doesn't Threaten the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
151. Tingyang Zhao, "Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept 'All-under-Heaven' (Tianxia)," Social Identities, Vol. 12, No. 1 (January 2006), pp. 29-41.
152. For a comprehensive view of Zhao's Tianxia philosophy, see Zhao Tingyang, Tianxia tixi: Shijie zhidu zhexue daolun [The Tianxia system: A philosophy for the world institution] (Nanjing, China: Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe, 2005).
153. Victoria Tin-bor Hui argues that an interpretation of Chinese history as a benign Confucian order is historically inaccurate.
154. See Hui, "How China Was Ruled," American Interest, Vol. 3, No. 4 (March-April 2008), pp. 53-65.
155. In contrast, Zhao Tingyang argues that the contemporary "reconstruction" of traditional Chinese ideas is key, not the historical accuracy of those ideas.
156. See Zhao, "Tianxia Tixi de Yige Jianyao Biaoshu" [An introduction of Tianxia (all-under-heaven) system], World Economics and Politics, October 2008, p. 85.
157. Some Chinese scholars view the hierarchic nature of this alternative world as highly problematic.
158. See Yaqing Qin, "Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory?" International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2007), p. 330.
159. Zhao Tingyang, "Tianxia gainian yu shijie zhidu" [The Tianxia concept and the world system], in Qin Yaqing, ed., Zhongguo Xuezhe Kan Shijie: Guoji Zhixue Juan [Chinese scholars' views of the world: International order] (Beijing: New World Press, 2006), p. 6.
160. Xiang Lanxing, "Jieyan Jueqi, Shenyan Hexie" [Stop talking "rise," be cautious about talking "harmony"], Lianhe Zaobao, March 26, 2006.
161. See also Callahan, "Chinese Visions of World Order.".
162. Callahan, "Chinese Visions of World Order.".
163. Zhao, "Tianxia gainian yu shijie zhidu," pp. 30-31.
164. Pan Wei, "Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 12, No. 34 (2003), pp. 3-43.
165. Yan Xuetong, "Xun Zi's Thoughts on International Politics and Their Implications," Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Summer 2008), p. 159.
166. For an overview, see Shiping Hua, "A Perfect World," Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), pp. 62-67.
167. Not all Chinese scholars, however, share this vision of building a Chinese school.
168. Ren Xiao, "Toward a Chinese School of International Relations?" inWang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian, eds., China and the New International Order (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 296-297.
169. Yaqing Qin, "Guanxi benwei yu guocheng jiangou: Jiang Zhongguo linian zhiru guoji guanxi lilun" [Relationality and processual construction: Bringing Chinese ideas into international relations theory] Zhongguo Shehui Kexue [Social Sciences in China], No. 4 (2009), pp. 5-20.
170. Yaqing Qin, "International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities, and China's Peaceful Rise," Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer 2010), pp. 129-153.
171. Jack L. Snyder, "Some Good and Bad Reasons for a Distinctively Chinese Approach to International Relations Theory," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, August 28-31, 2008, p. 6.
172. Yinghong Shi, "Fengwu Changyi Fangyanliang: Zhongguo Yinyou De Waijiao Zhexue he Shiji Dazhanlue" [To have a long vision: Diplomatic philosophy on external affairs and secular grand strategy for China in the 21st century], Journal of HIT (Social Science edition), Vol. 3, No. 2 (June 2001), p. 15.
173. Wang Yiwei, "Zhongguo Fuxin Bushi Fengxiang Meiguo Baquan" [China's rise is not to share the American hegemony], Huanqiu Shibao, January 17, 2008, http://column.huanqiu.com/wangyiwei/2008-01/48528.html.
174. Wang Yiwei, "China's Rise: An Unlikely Pillar of U.S. Hegemony," Harvard International Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Spring 2007), pp. 60-63.
175. Shi, "Fengwu Changyi Fangyanliang," p. 15.
176. For an English translation of this essay, see Yu Keping, Democracy Is a Good Thing: Essays on Politics, Society, and Culture in Contemporary China (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008).
177. For a detailed documentation of this approach, see Steinfeld, Playing Our Game.
178. Yinghong Shi, "Zhongmei Guanxi Jiben Toushi He Zhanlue Fengxi" [U.S.-China relations: Basic perspectives and strategic analysis], Forum of World Economy and Politics, No. 4 (2007), p. 11.
179. See also Richard Rosecrance, "Power and International Relations: The Rise of China and Its Effects," International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 1 (February 2006), pp. 31-35.
180. Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner, and Steven Weber, "Chinese Ways," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May/June 2008), p. 166.
181. The existing international relations literature conceptualizes negotiated orders in a liberal political sense, such as in terms of "constitutional contracts" or "legislative bargaining.".
182. See Oran R. Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), especially p. 283.
183. We use this term in a broader sense, meaning the process of how actors with diverse preferences build and maintain an order through constant interactions and negotiations. This is closer to a sociological understanding of the term.
184. See Gary Alan Fine, "Negotiated Orders and Organizational Cultures," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 10 (August 1984), p. 241.
185. Chinese scholar Yaqing Qin expresses a similar idea to describe the ideational interaction between China and the West.
186. See Yaqing Qin, "Yanjiu Shejie yu Xueshu Zhuanxin" [Research design for academic innovation], World Economics and Politics, No. 8 (2008), p. 76.
187. For the discussion of a nonpolar world or a world in which polarity is less important, see Richard N. Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May/June 2008), pp. 44-56.
188. For a discussion of power diffusion, see Randall L. Schweller, "Entropy and the Trajectory of World Politics: Why Polarity Has Become Less Meaningful," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 2010), pp. 145-163.
189. Chen Yugang, Quanqiu Jingrong Weiji, and Meiguo Shuailuo, "You Guoji Zhixu De Bianpinghua" [Global financial crisis, the United States' decline, and the flattening of international order], World Economics and Politics, No. 5 (2009), pp. 28-34.
190. Growth rates differ for many reasons: for example, innovation tends to cluster; the diffusion of technology benefits secondary and late movers (imitation costs are much lower than innovation costs); hegemons overpay for defense and become addicted to consumption, resulting in massive debt that eventually crowds out research and development spending; the ratio of retirees to workers; and so on.
191. Niall Ferguson, "Complexity and Collapse: Empires on the Edge of Chaos," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 2 (March/April 2010), pp. 18-32.
192. Randall L. Schweller, "The Future Is Uncertain and the End Is Always Near," Cambridge Review of International Affairs (forthcoming).
193. This vision and strategy are related to the "rightful resistance" approach
194. Ren Xiao, "Women Ruhe Duidai Chayi: Dui Hexie Shijie zhi neihai De Yige Tantao" [How we should deal with differences: An inquiry into the meaning of a harmonious world], Foreign Affairs Review (Beijing), No. 97 (August 2007), pp. 37-39.
195. Wang, "China's Search for Stability with America.".
196. See also Wang Jisi, "America in Asia: How Much Does China Care?" Global Asia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 2007), pp. 27-28.
197. Wang Jisi, "Meiguo Baquan de Luoji" [The logic of American hegemony], in Qin, Zhongguo Xuezhe Kan Shijie, p. 95.
198. Ren Xiao, "'Meilijian Diguo' Lun de Xingqi Yu Meiguo De DaZhanlue" [The rise of "the American empire" proposition and America's grand stategy], in Qin, Zhongguo Xuezhe Kan Shijie, p. 150.
199. For a summary of such an orientation, see Lynch, "Envisioning China's Political Future," pp. 701-722.
200. "Transcript of Interview with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao," CNN.com/asia, September 28, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/29/chinese.premier.transcri pt/.
201. Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
202. Wang Jisi, "Inside China," Global Asia, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2010), pp. 8-9.
203. Quoted in Melinda Liu, "Analyze This: On the Eve of Obama's Visit, China Reveals an Identity Crisis," Newsweek, November 14, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/11/13/analyzethis.html.
204. Elizabeth C. Economy and Adam Segal, "The G-2 Mirage: Why the United States and China Are Not Ready to Upgrade Ties," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 3 (May/June 2009), pp. 14-23.
205. Jian Junbo, "China Says 'No Thanks' to G2," Asian Times, May 29, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KE29Ad01.html.
206. Wu Xinbo, "Understanding the Geopolitical Implications of the Global Financial Crisis," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 (October 2010), p. 159.
207. Wu Jiao and Zhang Yuwen, "China Will Focus on Peaceful Development: Wen," China Daily, September 24, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010WenUN/2010-09/24/content_11340567 .htm.
208. These mismatches within the relationship center on Washington's and Beijing's dramatically different views on sovereignty, sanctions, and the use of force.
209. See Economy and Segal, "The G-2 Mirage," p. 16.
210. For a response to this type of criticism that involves the "infrapolitics" of subordinate groups, see Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, chap. 7.
211. Leonard Berkowitz, Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), pp. 204-227.
212. Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy, trans. S.S. Lloyd (Roseville, Calif.: Dry Bones, 2000), pp. 98, 110.
213. "The proximate task of politics," writes List, "always consists in clearly perceiving in what respect the alliance and equalization of the different interests is at the moment most pressing, and to strive that until this equalization is attained all other questions may be suspended and kept in the background.".
214. Zygmunt Bauman, Socialism: The Active Utopia (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1976), p. 123.