After victory: Institutions, strategic restraint, and the rebuilding of order after major wars

After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-293

  Ikenberry, G John ^a  

^a NONE

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References (527)

1. For a list of European and global postwar settlements, see Appendix One.
2. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
3. For other arguments along these lines, see Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Theory: A Critique," Review of International Studies, Vol. 17 (January 1991), pp. 67-85;
4. David A. Lake, "Anarchy, Hierarchy and the Variety of International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 50 (1997), pp. 1-33;
5. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "Reconceptualizing Anarchy," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1996), pp. 403-39;
6. and Helen V. Millner, "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics," in Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, eds., Explorations and Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Cambridge:MIT Press, 1999), pp. 119-2;
7. For a discussion see G. John Ikenberry, "Constitutional Politics in International Relations, " European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4, No.2 (June 1998), pp. 147-2;
8. Robert Gilpin,War and Change inWorld Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 41-2;
9. This type of change is contrasted with "systems change," which refers to change in the basic character of the actors within the global system;
10. and it is contrasted with "interaction change," which refers to change in the political, economic, and other processes among actors.
11. Peter J. Katzenstein, "International Relations Theory and the Analysis of Change," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Chal lenges (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 296.
12. For a recent survey of alternative conceptions of change within international relations theory, see Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds., New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997).
13. See Redvers Opie et al. The Search for Peace Settlements (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1951), pp. 2-2;
14. For surveys of the major postwar settlements, see Robert Randle, The Origins of Peace: A Study of Peacemaking and the Structure of Peace Settlements (New York: Free Press, 1973);
15. Charles F. Doran, The Politics of Assimilation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971);
16. Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace andWar: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991);
17. and CharlesW. Kegley, Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond, How Nations Make Peace (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).
18. Robert Jervis, "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert," American Historical Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (June 1992), p. 723.
19. For comparisons of American and British hegemony, see Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York:Basic Books, 1975);
20. David Lake, "British and American Hegemony Compared: Lessons for the Current Era of Decline," in Michael Fry, ed., History, the White House, and the Kremlin:Statesmen as Historians (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 106-22;
21. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1992).
22. For a useful discussion of "optimistic" (Kantian) and "despairing" (Rousseauian) intellectual traditions on the question of international order, see Ian Clark, The Hierarchy of States:Reform and Resistance in the International Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
23. For a survey of theories of international order, see John A. Hall, International Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), chapter one.
24. According to Talcott Parsons, the original articulator of the "problem of order" was Hobbes, who argued that individuals operating in the state of nature would not be able to create order among themselves-that is, establish stable, recurrent, and cooperative social relations. The solution would ultimately require the imposition of order by a hierarchical sovereign. See Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937), pp. 89-2;
25. Albert Hirschman shows that the modern intellectual response to Hobbes, leading to Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, was to cast doubt on Hobbes's problem of order by suggesting that certain human motivations kept others under control and, most importantly, that the pursuit of political and economic self-interest was not typically an uncontrollable "passion" but a civilized, gentle activity. See Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1977).
26. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics. For extensions and debates, see Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
27. See Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics.
28. Waltz's classic statement of neorealism assigns little significance to the role of international institutions. For recent discussions of international institutions within the realist tradition, see Randall L. Schweller and David Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, Supplement (May 1997), pp. 1-32;
29. and Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-6.
30. Why principled agreement is sought by leading postwar states and how it might be secured among unequal states are important questions that neorealist hegemonic theories cannot answer. See G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 283-6.
31. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-57;
32. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," Atlantic, No. 266 (August 1990), pp. 35-50;
33. Conor Cruise O'Brien, "The Future of theWest," National Interest, No. 30 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 3-10;
34. and Stephen M. Walt, "The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America Are Drifting Apart," National Interest, No. 54 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 3-2;
35. See, for example, Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-6;
36. Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86-6;
37. and Josef Joffe, " 'Bismarck' or 'Britain'? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 94-6.
38. See Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-6;
39. and Robert F. Lieber, response to Walt, "The Ties That Fray," in National Interest, No. 55 (Spring 1999), p. 114.
40. William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-6.
41. See Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order," Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring 1999), pp. 179-6.
42. No single theorist represents this composite liberal orientation, but a variety of theorists provide aspects. On the democratic peace, see Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12 (1983), pp. 205-35, 323-53.
43. On security communities, see Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1998);
44. and Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
45. On the interrelationship of domestic and international politics, see James Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York: Free Press, 1969).
46. On functional integration theory, see Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).
47. On the fragmented and complex nature of power and interdependence, see Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston:Little, Brown, 1977).
48. On the modernization theory underpinnings of the liberal tradition, see Edward Morse, Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations (New York: Free Press, 1976);
49. and James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
50. The liberal literature on international institutions and regimes is large. For overviews, see Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981);
51. Steph Haggard and Beth Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 41 No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 491-517;
52. Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995);
53. and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
54. For an excellent survey of institutional and regime theory, see Lisa L. Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," in Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, eds. Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, pp. 89-2;
55. The seminal statement of neoliberal institutional theory is Keohane, After Hegemony.
56. Oran Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," International Organization Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1991), p. 282.
57. See also Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
58. The concept of constitutional contract is discussed in James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), esp. chapter 5.
59. See Keohane, After Hegemony. The general theoretical position is sketched in Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32 (December 1988), pp. 379-96
60. and Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-6.
61. See also Lisa Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
62. See Lisa Martin, "An Institutionalist View: International Institutions and State Strategies," in T. V. Paul and John A. Hall, eds., International Order and the Future of World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
63. The neoliberal approach argues that institutions are essentially functional or utilitarian "solutions" to problems encountered by rational actors seeking to organize their environment in a way that advances their interests.
64. Kenneth A. Shepsle describes institutions as "agreements about a structure of cooperation" that reduces transaction costs, opportunism, and other forms of "slippage." Sheplse, "Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions," in Herbert F.Weisberg, ed., Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York: Agathon, 1986), p. 74.
65. As AlexWendt argues, "Constructivists are interested in the construction of identity and interests and, as such, take a more sociological than economic approach" to theory.
66. Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 384-6.
67. Adopting a similar view, Peter J. Katzenstein argues that "institutionalized power can be seen to mold the identity of the states themselves and thus the interests they hold." Katzenstein, "United Germany in an Integrating Europe," in Katzenstein, ed., Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 5.
68. See also Christian Reus-Smit, "The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), pp. 555-6.
69. Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," Annual Review of Political Science (Palo Alto:Annual Reviews, Inc., 1999), pp. 369-404;
70. and Sven Steinmo, et al. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analsysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
71. See Keohane, After Hegemony. For a discussion of how neoliberal institutional theory is useful in explaining distributive struggles and competitive security relations between unequal states, see Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge After the ColdWar," in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York:Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 269-300
72. and Keohane and Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," in International Security.
73. These strategies are distinguished in terms of their power restraint mechanisms. Strategies of institutional binding and supranationalism are specific ways in which states can introduce constitutional characteristics into postwar order.
74. John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 9.
75. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
76. See Raymond Aron, Peace and War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966)
77. and Stanley Hoffmann, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), chapter eight.
78. Order is obviously only one feature of world politics. Critics of this focus argue that to give order analytical primacy is to give the study of international politics a static, statist, and Western bias. See Steve Smith, "Is the Truth out There? Eight Questions about International Order," in T. V. Paul and John A. Hall, eds., International Order and the Future ofWorld Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
79. For a discussion of the contested meaning of order, see RobertW. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996).
80. Hedley Bull, The Anarachical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 7.
81. Robert Gilpin,War and Change inWorld Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 42.
82. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 95.
83. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 127.
84. For discussions of balance-of-power politics, see Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power," in Butterfield and Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 149-76;
85. Edward V. Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967);
86. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York:Random House, 1962), pp. 3-93;
87. Claude, "The Balance of Power Revisited," Review of International Studies, Vol. 15 (April 1989), pp. 77-86;
88. Ernst Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda,"World Politics, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1953), pp. 370-98;
89. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987);
90. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997);
91. and Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), chapter five.
92. On the tendency of balancing over bandwagoning in international relations, see Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp. 17-33, 263-66.
93. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 126.
94. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 15.
95. See Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).
96. For discussions of hegemonic power and hegemonic stability theory, see Charles Kindleberger, TheWorld in Depression, 1929-1939 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973);
97. Stephen Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 317-6;
98. Robert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Direct Foreign Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1973);
99. Robert Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Change in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977," in O. R. Holsti, R. M. Siverson, and Alexander George, eds., Change in the International System (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 131-62;
100. Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Autumn 1987), pp. 551-6;
101. and David P. Rapkin, ed., World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990).
102. For a review of the literature, see David A. Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?" International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (December 1993), pp. 459-6.
103. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, pp. 42-2;
104. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics.
105. The distinction between benevolent and coercive hegemony is made by Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," International Organization, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Autumn 1985), (1985), pp. 579-614;
106. Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony:Or Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Spring 1985), pp. 207-6;
107. and Joseph Lepgold, The Declining Hegemon: The United States and European Defense, 1960-1990 (New York: Praeger, 1990).
108. Most of the countries of the world have constitutions, but this in itself does not make them constitutional political orders. As a recent study of Eastern European constitutional experience notes, although these countries under communism did have constitutional charters or texts, "they were not meant to constrain and to obligate the power elites. They had little, if anything, to do with the idea of constitutionalism." Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 63.
109. Stephen D. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), p. 117.
110. These enabling conditions are developed in the next chapter.
111. Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 198.
112. Constitutions entail both denials and grants of power. See Samuel H. Beer, To Make a Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 97.
113. See Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America (Boston: Ginn, 1950).
114. For a typology of regimes and constitutional agreements, see Alec Stone, "What Is a Supranational Constitution? An Essay in International Relations Theory," Review of Politics, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 441-6.
115. For a discussion of constitutional constraints that emphasizes both the negative features of constitutional binding and its positive and dynamic purposes as a mode of institutional design, see Stephen Holmes, "Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy," in Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 152-2;
116. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 9.
117. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge: Belkap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 6.
118. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 36.
119. See also Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
120. Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), p. 2.
121. See also Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).
122. Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, p. 136.
123. James D. Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998)
124. See also Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Inter-Ethnic Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 715-6.
125. Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," p. 118.
126. JosephWeiler, "The Transformation of Europe," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 100, No. 8 (June 1991), p. 2407.
127. Taking this view, Robert Dahl argues in regard to constitutional rules in the United States: "to assume that this country remained democratic because of the Constitution seems to me an obvious reversal of the relation; it is much more plausible to suppose that the Constitution has remained because our society is essentially democratic." Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), p. 143.
128. See also Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), chapter ten.
129. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 21.
130. In practice, an international order with strong constitutional characteristics may, in relative terms, look more like a domestic political order with weak constitutional characteristics. But the point is that constitutionalism-whether in domestic or international political order-varies, and therefore variations can be identified and explained.
131. Actual orders may in fact exhibit characteristics of each of these basic types.
132. See Leo Gross, "The Peace ofWestphalia, 1648-1948," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, No. 1 (January 1948), pp. 20-6.
133. See Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chapter two.
134. See John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 139-6.
135. Stephen D. Krasner, "Westphalia and All That," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 235-2;
136. See Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
137. For a recent survey, see Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory (London:Routledge, 1996).
138. Organski, for example, identifies six methods by which states might attempt to maintain the balance of power: to arm, seize territory, establish buffer zones, form alliances, intervene in the internal affairs of other nations, or divide and conquer. A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 267.
139. See Mathew S. Anderson, "Eighteenth-Century Theories of Balance of Power," in Ragnhild Hatton and Mathew S. Anderson, eds., Studies in Diplomatic History: Essays in Memory of David Bayne Horn (London: Archon Books, 1970), pp. 183-2;
140. Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability (London: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 121.
141. These terms are from Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
142. See PaulW. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945:Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1975), pp. 227-62;
143. and Snyder, Alliance Politics, chapter nine.
144. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945," p. 230.
145. The assumption that institutions can have an independent ordering impact on states is discussed in chapter three below.
146. French support for the ECSC was also driven by more practical and immediate commercial goals, such as gaining access to cheap German coal as an input to its steel production. The actual political and economic achievements of the ECSC are also widely questioned. See John Gillingham, Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955: The Germans and French from the Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991);
147. Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951 (Berkeley and Los Angeles:University of California Press, 1984);
148. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London:Routledge, 1993);
149. and Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), chapter two.
150. Frederico G. Manicini, "The Making of a Constitution for Europe," in Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The New European Community (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 177-94;
151. Eric Stein, "Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 75, No. 1 (January 1981), pp. 1-6;
152. and Joseph Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
153. Mancini, "The Making of a Constitution for Europe," p. 178.
154. Mancini, "The Making of a Constitution for Europe."
155. Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, p. 86.
156. See Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 261-6.
157. See Robert Jervis, Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 94-2;
158. John Herz, "The Impact of the Technological-Scientific Process on the International System," in Abdul Said, ed., Theory of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 115.
159. Jervis, System Effects, p. 95.
160. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chapter ten.
161. Henry Kissinger, AWorld Restored: The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Age (New York: Grosset and Dunlop, 1964), pp. 317-2;
162. In the classic formulation of the argument, Kenneth Waltz argues that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar systems, whereas KarlW. Deutsch and J. David Singer argue that multipolar systems are more stable. Both agree that a multipolar order entails a much more complex set of variables and power relations, creating more uncertainty about how particular balancing policies will impact on the wider system. The disagreement is really over whether this uncertainty creates more opportunities for false steps and destabilizing foreign policy or whether it encourages prudence and caution.
163. SeeWaltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus, Vol. 43, No. 3 (1964), pp. 881-901;
164. Deutsch and Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," World Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3 (April 1964), pp. 390-6;
165. and Richard Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolority and the Future," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1966), pp. 314-2;
166. For a review of the debate, see Jack Levy, "The Polarity of the System and International Stability: An Empirical Analysis," in Alan Ned Sabrosky, ed., Polarity and War: The Changing Structure of International Conflict (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985).
167. Gilpin, "The Theory of HegemonicWar," in Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb, eds., The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 16.
168. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 50
169. There is a large literature that explores this process of power transition. See Gilpin, War and Change; Organski, World Politics;
170. Organski and Jack Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1980);
171. and Richard Ned Lebow and Barry S. Strauss, eds., Hegemonic Rivalry from Thucydides to the Nuclear Age (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991).
172. See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, chapter one.
173. The European Union is a possible exception.
174. I am using the terms constitutional order (or settlement) and binding institutional order (or settlement) interchangeably.
175. This model's assumption about the power goals of the leading state is broadly realist. The state seeks to use its power as efficiently as possible. It wants to preserve and extend its power position into the future, and it is willing to give up some "returns" on its power in the short run in favor of a greater longer-term return on its power if such a possibility exists. For discussions of alternative realist assumptions about the power goals of states, see Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991);
176. Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998);
177. Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security Studies, Vol. 17, No. 5 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-6;
178. Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90;
179. and Joseph M. Grieco, "Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics," in Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds., New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 163-2;
180. See Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power."
181. This is true even if the leading state has to use more power resources at the outset to obtain agreement on basic rules and institutions, and even if it has to compromise (to some extent) for the sake of agreement on the character of those rules and institutions.
182. Lisa Martin, "The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism," in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 110.
183. This line of analysis builds on institutionalist theory pioneered by Robert Keohane in After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
184. Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), p. 32.
185. The classic statement of these state choices is Arnold Wolfers's distinction between "possession" and "milieu" foreign policy goals. See Wolfers, "The Goals of Foreign Policy," Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 73-2;
186. The claim is that institutions can have an independent ordering impact on their environment even after the disappearance or decline of the actors that created them. See James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Discovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989).
187. Regarding international regimes, see Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982);
188. and Oran Young, International Cooperation:Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), chapter three.
189. The more confident that the leading state is that institutions can be constructed that will perpetuate its interests into the future, the more it will be willing to give up some gains in the short term in favor of a longer-term strategy. In effect, the greater the stickiness of institutions, the lower the leading state's discount rate for calculating its interests over the long term.
190. The processes of feedback and increasing returns to institutions are themes developed later in the chapter.
191. See Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43 (April 1991), pp. 336-2;
192. See Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1991), p. 282.
193. For a useful discussion of the distinction between substantive and institutional agreements, see Adam Przeworski, "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts," in Jon Elster and Rune Stagstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 64-2;
194. Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R.Weingast, "Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice," Public Choice, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1981), pp. 503-2;
195. Riker, "Implications from the Disequilbrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 2 (June 1980), pp. 444-45
196. The observation has been made, for example, that the United States is better organized than Japan to operate within far-flung multilateral institutions, whereas Japan finds itself better able to operate within formal bilateral relations. Chalmers Johnson, lecture at University of Pennsylvania, 2 April 1996. The implication is that, as a result, their incentives to create and operate within multilateral institutions will differ because of these different internal organizational characteristics and orientations.
197. See Przeworski, "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflict."
198. The argument is made later that democracies are better suited to operate within institutionalized orders than nondemocracies, and that the postwar order favored by the United States after 1945 was one that was particularly congenial toWestern democratic polities. Not only are democracies better able to establish institutions that serve to reduce the returns to power but also individuals within democratic polities are likely to be experienced and capable of operating effectively within them.
199. Peter F. Cowhey, "Elect Locally-Order Globally: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Cooperation," in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 158.
200. Elster, "Introduction," in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 15.
201. In terms of the business firm analogy, this would be equivalent to inviting shareholders to sit on the board of directors of the firm.
202. For a discussion of how formal institutions provide ways for powerful states to convey credible restraint to weaker states, see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 1 (February 1998), pp. 3-6.
203. Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), p. 288.
204. See also Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 331-34;
205. and Grieco, "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme," Review of International Studies, Vol. 21 (1995), pp. 21-2;
206. The classic formulation of this logic is Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty-Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
207. Daniel Deudney, "The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union," International Organization, Vol. 49 (Spring 1995), pp. 191-228;
208. and "Binding Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in Philadelphian Systems," in Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. pp. 213-2;
209. See PaulW. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945:Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1975), pp. 227-2;
210. As Schroeder notes, the internal constraint function of alliances was earlier observed by George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 9-11 and 20-21;
211. and Liska, Alliances and the Third World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), pp. 24-2;
212. For an overview of alliance theory, see Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 156-6.
213. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945," p. 230.
214. For a discussion of this dynamic, see Patricia A. Weitsman, "Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 156-6.
215. For a formal analysis of intra-alliance dynamics under conditions of inequality, see James Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (November 1991), pp. 904-6.
216. Japanese-American security binding is explored in Peter J. Katzenstein and Yutaka Tsujinka, " 'Bullying,' 'Buying,' and 'Binding': US-Japanese Transnational Relations and Domestic Structures," in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 79-2;
217. The argument is not that these binding and locking constraints on states are ever absolute, only that if they operate at least to some extent, the model of the constitutional bargain presented earlier has some viability.
218. On the "logic of appropriateness" and the "logic of consequences," see March and Olsen, Discovering Institutions; and March and Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," in Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, eds., Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 303-2;
219. Gerhard von Glahn, Law among Nations, 4th edition (New York: Macmillan, 1981), p. 3.
220. Fredrick Sherwood Dunn, "International Legisalation," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4 (December 1927), p. 585.
221. For a general discussion of the sources of international legal authority, see Anthony Clark Arend, "Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics," Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Winter 1998), pp. 107-6.
222. Treaties and international agreements often require supplemental implementing legislation that further extends and integrates the institutional agreement into the domestic political system.
223. See Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories."
224. See Peter Haas, ed., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination, special issue of International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992).
225. The legal rational sources of bureaucratic power identified by Max Weber are also sources of autonomy and authority within intergovernmental organizations. See H. H. Gerth and C.Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
226. See Kathryn Sikkink, "Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks and Sovereignty in Latin Ameica," International Organization, Vol. 47 (Summer 1993), pp. 411-41;
227. Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995);
228. Andrew Moravcsik, "Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory andWestern Europe," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1 (June 1995), pp. 157-89;
229. and Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
230. Hans Muller, "The Internationalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments:The Case of Security Regimes," in Volker Rittberger with the assistance of Peter Mayer, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 361-88;
231. and John Duffield, "International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels," International Organization, Vol. 46 (Autumn 1992), pp. 819-2;
232. There is a large domestic structures literature that explores how state structures and political institutions have these sorts of impacts. See Peter Evans, et al., eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985);
233. Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University ofWisconsin Press, 1978);
234. Peter Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986);
235. Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986);
236. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1995).
237. For an overview, see Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in Steinmo, Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-2;
238. Robert Powell argues that where the threat of war is absent, states are more likely to calculate their interests in terms of absolute gains. Constitutional commitments are, in effect, joint commitments to conduct relations without the threat or resort to war.
239. See Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 1303-6.
240. Both rational choice and sociological theories of institutions offer theories of institutional path dependency, and both emphasize the phenomenon of increasing returns. See Brian Arthur, "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events," Economic Journal, Vol. 99 (March 1989), pp. 116-2;
241. On sunk costs, see Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), pp. 108-2;
242. The phenomenon of sunk costs means that the maintenance of an international institution will be easier than building a new institution, even when the hypothetical new institution may more closely accord with state interests. As one study indicates, "the high costs of regime building help existing regimes to persist." Sean Lynn-Jones, "The Incidents at Sea Agreement," in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Dallin, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievement, Failures, Lessons (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 498-2;
243. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 95.
244. For discussions of path dependency arguments and their implications, see Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," Comparative Politics, Vol. 16 (January 1984);
245. and Paul Pierson, "When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change," World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 4 (July 1993), pp. 595-6.
246. For a survey of the literature of path dependency, see Stephen K. Sanderson, Social Evolutionism: A Critical History (London: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
247. See W. Brian Arthur, "Positive Feedbacks in the Economy," Scientific American Vol. 262, No. 2 (February 1990), pp. 92-6.
248. Reprinted in Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), pp. 1-2;
249. Arthur, "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Small Events." 56 This notion of breakpoint or critical juncture is not developed in the increasing returns literature, but it is implicit in the argument, and it is very important for understanding the path dependency of particular types of international order. For a survey of path-dependent and increasing-returns logic as it relates to political systems
250. see Paul Pierson, "Path Dependency, Increasing Returns, and the Study of Politics," unpublished paper, Harvard University, 1996.
251. A particular set of postwar institutions might in fact be adaptable-capable of internal change and reform-and this will increase the cost advantage of the existing institutions in the face of potential rivals. The post-1945 Bretton Woods institutions, for example, evolved considerably over the postwar period, responding to functional changes but also adapting to pressures from states to make them more congenial to their interests. Adaptations in the existing institutions make the attractions of a wholesale replacement of these institutions less compelling, which in turn reenforces the stability and continuity of the prevailing postwar institutional order.
252. Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988);
253. and Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1994). Over time, states have had better data at their disposal and can therefore more accurately assess their power trajectory. In the aftermath of wars, states are also in a better position to assess power disparities. As Geoffrey Blainey argues, war clarifies power relations. Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973).
254. See Appendix Two for a fuller presentation of relevant military and economic data.
255. See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), chapter four.
256. For a survey of arguments in this area, see Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 109-6.
257. See also Charles Lipson, "Reliable Partners: The 'Promising Advantage' of Democracies as an Explanation of Peace," Unpublished paper, University of Chicago, 1998.
258. For a formal exploration of the relationship between external commitments and internal political costs, see James Fearon's work on domestic audience costs. The argument is that the signals that leaders send to other actors are more credible when those signals bear domestic political costs.
259. See Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88 (September 1994), pp. 577-2;
260. Other nations will be more willing to enter into an agreement that they know will be maintained. Referring to the openness of American democracy, Michael Mastanduno argues, "the transparency of the United States political system helps to increase the prospects for enduring international cooperation." Mastanduno, "The United States Political System and International Leadership: A 'Decidedly Inferior' Form of Government," in G. John Ikenberry, American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, 2nd ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), p. 343.
261. See also Peter Cowhey, "Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States," International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 299-6.
262. In this sense, information about intentions and commitments flows in both directions. Democracies expose themselves more fully to other states than do nondemocracies, and their accessible institutions also allow them to absorb more information on the policies and motivations of other states.
263. See Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order," Review of International Studies, Vol. 25 (April 1999), pp. 179-2;
264. When groups of democracies interact, their open, decentralized, and permeable characteristics facilitate more extensive interpenetration than when nondemocracies interact. In the study of interorganizational relationships, Neal Smelser has described this situation as "structural conductivity"-the structures of society that permit or even encourage organizations to form relationships. See Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1962).
265. This term is introduced in Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "Liberal Competence:The Performance of Democracies in Great Power Balancing," unpublished paper, 1994.
266. See Cowhey, "Elect Locally-Order Globally."
267. Scholars differ as to how long the concert system lasted. Some argue that it was in decline or ended in the early or mid-1820s. See Inis Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares (New York:Random House, 1956);
268. F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963);
269. and Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity:1812-1822 (New York: Viking, 1961 edition). Others argue that it lasted until the Crimean war (1854-1856) or untilWorldWar I.
270. See PaulW. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the CrimeanWar: The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972);
271. Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983);
272. and Kal J. Holsti, "Governance without Government: Polyarchy in Nineteenth-Century European International Politics," in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, ed., Governance without Government: Order and Change inWorld Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 30-2;
273. Scholars have long debated the Vienna settlement's logic and significance, particularly the issue of whether the concert system constituted simply a modification and refinement of the balance of power or a much more fundamental departure from the balance. See the debate in the American History Review forum, centered around Paul W. Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" American History Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (June 1992), pp. 683-6.
274. The leading view of the Vienna settlement has been that it was fundamentally a reestablishment of the balance of power. As Edward Gulick argues: "When the time came to discuss preliminary plans for peace, the statesmen flew as straight as bees toward the hive of balance of power. The state system was to be restored; Prussia was to be increased in order to stabilize north-central Europe;and France was to be reduced to a size compatible with the secure independence of other states." Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955), p. 121.
275. The balance-of-power system after 1815 might not have been as unvarnished as in the eighteenth century, but its fundamentals were the same. Others have argued that the balance of power was refined and socialized in Vienna; the operation of balance was more self-conscious and rooted in a mutual recognition of the necessities and virtues of "equilibrium" among the European powers. See Henry Kissinger, AWorld Restored:Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973). Others have gone still further and argued that the Vienna settlement constituted a more fundamental break with older forms of European balance-of-power politics. In this view, Vienna represented the rejection of the classical balance in favor of a quasi-institutionalized concert system of great-power cooperation.
276. See Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-6;
277. Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 173-6;
278. Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 58-6;
279. Richard Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," World Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (January 1976), pp. 159-6;
280. and Paul Gordon Lauren, "Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy," in Alexander George, ed., Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention (Boulder, Colo.:Westview, 1983), pp. 31-2;
281. Building on this view, the historian Paul Schroeder has led a reconsideration of the sources of order in post-Napoleonic Europe that emphasizes the transformations in the institutions and practices of European security. In this view, the settlement did not rest only (or even fundamentally) on the balance of power but was built on a mix of power and institutional constraint arrangements. See Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
282. As one scholar puts it, "the greatest significance of the Vienna settlement lies in the fact that it saw the creation of the first deliberately contrived international system rather than in the precise nature of its territorial dispositions." Richard Langhorne, "Reflections on the Significance of the Congress of Vienna," Review of International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (October 1986), p. 314.
283. Britain does not appear to have given up much in the way of short-term gains in exchange for the institutional cooperation of the other European states. The institutional bargain was more specifically an agreement by Britain and the other major states to restrain the arbitrary use of power in territorial disputes, made credible by alliance and consultation mechanisms.
284. Charles Webster, The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815 (reprint, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1963), p. 45.
285. First published by the British Foreign Office, 1919.
286. Quoted in Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe, 1640-1990 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 176-2;
287. Langhorne, "Reflections on the Significance of the Congress of Vienna," p. 315.
288. Schroeder argues that the zenith of Napoleon's empire was 1809, because all the subsequent annexations and campaigns served to undermine it. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, p. 371.
289. See F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the European State System, 1815-1914 (London: Longman, 1980), p. 7.
290. Charles Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815 (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1950), p. 3
291. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 151-2;
292. See Appendix Two.
293. P. Bairoch, "International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980," Journal of European Economic History, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1982), p. 291.
294. Quoted in Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 128.
295. Osiander, The States System of Europe, pp. 178-2;
296. Schroeder, The Political Transformation of Europe, p. 309.
297. These comparisons are stressed by Paul Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" pp. 686-2;
298. Schroeder makes the strongest case in the historical literature that the post-Napoleonic period was dominated by British and Russian "pursuit of hegemony," although often under the guise of balance-of-power rhetoric.
299. "Official Communication made to the Russian Ambassador at London," 19 January 1805. Text in Charles Webster, ed., British Diplomacy, 1813-1815: Select Documents Dealing with the Reconstruction of Europe (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1921), Appendix 1, p. 390.
300. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, p. 309.
301. Quoted in Nicolson, The Congress of Europe, p. 155.
302. Castlereagh toWellington, 25 October 1814. Reprinted in CharlesWebster, ed., British Diplomacy, 1813-1815, p. 217.
303. Quoted in Osiander, The States System of Europe, p. 175.
304. Letter No. 1, Secret and Confidential, from Castlereagh (Paris) to Clancarty (Frankfurt), 5 November 1815. Quoted in Lauren, "Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy," p. 32.
305. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, p. 475.
306. Memorandum of Cabinet, 26 December 1813. Reprinted inWebster, ed., British Diplomacy, 1813-1815, pp. 123-2;
307. Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 33.
308. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, p. 160.
309. Webster, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 21-2;
310. Paul Schroeder reports that these combined contributions and subsidies were more than Britain had given in all previous wars together, and Britain's own military costs exceeded its expenditures on all others. In relative terms, Britain's costs in money and lives in waging the Napoleonic wars were greater than those incurred during World War I. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, pp. 485-2;
311. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, pp. 162-2;
312. See Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 58-2;
313. The best discussion of British subsidy policy during the war is John M. Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793-1815 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).
314. See Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, p. 162.
315. As we shall see, the United States was in a similar position during World War II.
316. See Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 43.
317. Signed on 9 March 1814.
318. Webster, British Diplomacy, 1813-1815, pp. 138-2;
319. Castlereagh to Liverpool, 10 March 1814. Quoted in Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 51.
320. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, p. 501.
321. Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, chapter fourteen.
322. Webster, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 50-2;
323. 12 October 1814. Quoted in Osiander, The States System of Europe, pp. 176-2;
324. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, p. 489.
325. Alexander proposed in 1804 that at the end of the war, "after having attached the nations to their governments by making these incapable of acting except in the greatest interest of their subjects," and European governments must "fix the relations of the states among each other on more precise rules, such as it will be in the interest of the nations to respect." The tsar's memorandum of 11 September 1804 is quoted in F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 193.
326. "Official Communication made to the Russian Ambassador at London," 19 January 1805, in Webster, ed. British Diplomacy, 1813-1815, p. 390.
327. See Webster, British Diplomacy, 1813-1815, pp. 19-2;
328. Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 22.
329. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawerence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1976), p. 230.
330. Osiander, The States System of Europe, p. 234. Emphasis in original.
331. See Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power, and Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822.
332. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," p. 232.
333. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, p. 207.
334. Langhorne, "The Development of International Conferences, 1648-1830," p. 85.
335. Fredrick Sherwood Dunn, "International Legislation," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 4 (December 1927), p. 578.
336. Viscount Castlereagh, Correspondence, Dispatches and Other Papers, 12 vols., edited by his brother, the Marquess of Londonderry (London: John Murray, 1848-1853), Vol. 12, p. 54.
337. Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," p. 168.
338. In rejecting Russian designs on Poland, Castlereagh argued that the new Russian frontier "would degrade the monarchs of Prussia and Austria in the eyes of their subjects and, whatever compensations they received elsewhere, leave them at the mercy of Russian military power. Russia, he even hinted, would have an influence over Europe to be compared with that of Napoleon." Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, p. 343.
339. Webster, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 132-2;
340. "Official Communication made to the Russian Ambassador at London," 19 January 1805, in Webster, ed., British Diplomacy, 1813-1815, pp. 389-2;
341. Russia was first to propose a special security guarantee with Britain, and it was recognized in the treaty between Russia and Great Britain of 11 April 1805, although only in rather vague and general terms.
342. Webster, British Diplomacy, 1813-1815, pp. 306-2;
343. See discussion in Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, pp. 573-2;
344. Langhorne, "Reflections on the Significance of the Congress of Vienna," p. 317.
345. See Douglas Dakin, "The Congress of Vienna, 1814-15, and Its Antecedents," in Alan Sked, ed., Europe's Balance of Power, 1815-1848 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979), pp. 30-2;
346. The Holy Alliance was drawn up by Tsar Alexander and signed on 26 September 1815 by the Emperor Francis I and by FredrickWilliam III, and ultimately by all European rulers except for the king of England, the pope, and the sultan of Turkey.
347. Langhorne, "The Development of International Conferences, 1648-1830," p. 85.
348. See Langhorne, "Reflections on the Significance of the Congress of Vienna," p. 317.
349. Quoted in Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 53.
350. This argument is developed in Chapter Three.
351. Castlereagh to Thornton, 10, 20 October 1812. Quoted in Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, p. 101.
352. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, p. 503.
353. Friedrich von Gentz, "Considerations on the Political System in Europe" (1818), in Mack Walker, ed., Metternich's Europe (New York: Walker, 1968), p. 80.
354. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815, pp. 480-81 and 497-99.
355. Ironically, the failure of a general guarantee had the effect of removing the thorny question of Russian influence in the Near East from the Vienna settlement.
356. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, p. 575.
357. Langhorne, "The Development of International Conferences, 1648-1830," p. 84.
358. See also Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, p. 573.
359. Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 101.
360. See Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Vol. 1, p. 192.
361. Martin, Peace without Victory, p. 21.
362. See also Curry, "Woodrow Wilson, Jan Smuts, and the Versailles Settlement."
363. Lloyd George speech, 5 January 1918.
364. For a useful overview of differences between French and American policies, see David Stevenson, "French War Aims and the American Challenge," Historical Journal, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1979), pp. 877-2;
365. Clemenceau and other French officials were determined to organize a coalition of powerful states, as Arnold Wolfers put it, committed to "holding the lid down on the boiling kettle of European unrest and dissatisfaction, not in a strategy, espoused by the British for pragmatic reasons, andWilson for philosophical ones, that called for a removal of the causes of revolt in order to eliminate the chances of an explosion." Wolfers, Britain and France between the Two Wars (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1963), p. 5.
366. Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1941), p. 196.
367. W. M. Jordan, Great Britain, France and the German Problem: 1918-1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), pp. 6-2;
368. For a good discussion of the complexity of French strategies, see Marc Trachtenberg, "Versailles after Sixty years," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 17, No. 3 (July 1982), pp. 498-6.
369. Lloyd George, quoted in Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After, p. 29.
370. See Knock, To End All Wars, p. 198.
371. Clemenceau, speech in the Chamber of Deputies, 29 December 1918, quoted in Jordan, Great Britain, France and the German Problem, p. 37.
372. On the flexibility of French postwar goals and Clemenceau's willingness to compromise on many of France's demands in exchange for an Anglo-American security guarantee, see David Stevenson, "FrenchWar Aims and Peace Planning," in Boemeke, Feldman, and Glaser, eds., The Treaty of Versailles, pp. 87-2;
373. See Knock, To End All Wars, pp. 221-22;
374. and Ambrosius,WoodrowWilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition, pp. 72-2;
375. Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1944), pp. 179-2;
376. This, of course, is in stark contrast to 1815 and 1945, when Britain and the United States, respectively, used their dominant wartime position to gain early agreement on common war aims and settlement goals.
377. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, pp. 67-2;
378. Quoted in Knock, To End All Wars, p. 175.
379. Some argue thatWilson won acceptance of the Fourteen Points, but only by conceding basic terms that would ultimately hauntWilson and prevent the realization of his agenda. See Klaus Schwabe,WoodrowWilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919 (Chapel Hil: University of North Carolina Press, 1985);
380. and Inga Floto, Colonel House in Paris: A Study in American Policy at Paris, 1919 (Copenhagen: Universitetsforlaget I Aurhus, 1973; reprinted by Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).
381. See also essays in Boemeke, Feldman, and Glaser, eds., The Treaty of Versailles.
382. Wilson, an annual message on the State of the Union, 2 December 1918, in Link, ed., Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 53, p. 285.
383. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, pp. 137-2;
384. Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 201.
385. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, p. 138.
386. Hutchins, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, p. 118.
387. See also Pond, The Rebirth of Europe, pp. 42-47;
388. and Peter J. Katzenstein, "United Germany in an Integrated Europe," in Katzenstein, ed, Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 1-2;
389. See Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 196-97.
390. Gorbachev, Remarks of the President and Soviet Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Malta, 3 December 1989, in Public Papers of President George Bush, 1989, Vol. 2, p. 1,633.
391. For a discussion of Gorbachev's evolving thinking, see Oberdorfer, The Turn, pp. 383-2;
392. Hutchins, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, pp. 107-2;
393. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 208-16.
394. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, pp. 161-2;
395. See Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 528.
396. Quoted in Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 529.
397. Hutchins, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, pp. 111-2;
398. See also Zelikow and Rice, Germany United and Europe Transformed, pp. 253, 180-81.
399. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 233.
400. Interview, Robert B. Zoellick, 28 May 1999.
401. Baker had a similar exchange with Gorbachev in Moscow two weeks before this exchange. See Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 251-2;
402. Quoted in Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 533.
403. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 258-59;
404. and Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 292-2;
405. Quoted in Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 295.
406. Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, p. 141.
407. Zelikow and Rice, Germany United and Europe Transformed, p. 332.
408. See Hutchins, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, pp. 103-4; and Oberdorfer, The Turn, p. 381.
409. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 238. Bush and Gorbachev engaged in a very similar exchange during their May 1990 summit in Washington. Gorbachev said that it was not in the Soviet interest to see an American "withdrawal" from Europe, and Bush argued that without Germany in NATO, the alliance would be jeopardized and with it the American presence in Europe. This exchange is reported in Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 533.
410. More generally within the Soviet foreign policy establishment, some officials saw security benefits in theWestern order that kept Germany and Japan bound to a larger Americanled alliance system. See Jerry Hough, Russia and the West: Gorbachev and the Politics of Reform (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), pp. 219-20;
411. and Michael J. Sodaro, Moscow, Germany, and the West from Khrushchev to Gorbachev (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 341-2;
412. For a discussion of recent historical works that emphasize the Soviet worry over the revival of German militarism more than American power during the ColdWar, see Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Cold War: What Do 'We Now Know'?" American Historical Review, Vol. 104, No. 2 (April 1999), pp. 515-6.
413. See Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 172-2;
414. Interview, Robert B. Zoellick, 28 May 1999.
415. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 605-2;Emphasis in original.
416. American officials working on these regional initiatives saw a strong relationship between economics and security. American presence and commitments to these regions after the Cold War would increasingly hinge on economic interests. To the extent that regional frameworks facilitated greater economic interdependence, American stakes in the regions increase and America's security role becomes more important. Interview, Robert B. Zoellick, 28 May 1999.
417. Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 60, No. 1 (15 October 1993), pp. 13-2;
418. See also Douglas Brinkley, "Democratic Enlargement:The Clinton Doctrine," Foreign Policy, No. 106 (Spring 1997), p. 116.
419. For a study of the American decision to expand NATO, see James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999).
420. Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright, Statement on NATO Enlargement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 24 February 1998, as released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, pp. 2-2;
421. Madeline K. Albright, "Why Bigger Is Better," Economist, Vol. 342 (15 February 1997), pp. 21-2;
422. Strobe Talbott, "Why NATO Should Grow," New York Review of Books, Vol. 42, No. 13 (August 10, 1995), pp. 27-2;
423. Albright, Statement on NATO Enlargement, 24 February 1998, p. 3.
424. According to Anthony Lake, this objective was "absolutely critical" to the thinking of the proponents of NATO enlargement within the Clinton administration. Interview, 20 September 1999.
425. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, p. 23.
426. Albright, Statement on NATO Enlargement, 24 February 1998, p. 3.
427. Talbott, "Why NATO Should Grow," p. 27.
428. Certain steps were specified as a necessary prelude to admission to the alliance: democratic institutions, progress a toward market economy, armed forces in civilian hands, settled territorial borders, and movement toward interoperability with NATO forces. See Fact Sheet prepared by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, 15 August 1997.
429. Talbott, "Why NATO Should Grow," pp. 27-2;
430. Albright, Statement on NATO Enlargement, 24 February 1998, p. 6.
431. Stanislaw Dobranski, "Toward a Pan-European Security System," address to the committees of National Defense and Foreign Affairs of the Belgian parliament, 29 April 1997.
432. Eastern and Central European leaders rarely argue that NATO membership was necessary to defend against a resurgent Russia but rather that it was part of a larger "European package," also involving eventual membership in the European Union, which was essential to the success of democratic and market reform. The security threat to these countries was not Russia but exclusion from Europe. See Christopher Jones, "NATO Enlargement: Brussels as the Heir of Moscow," Problems of Post-Communism, No. 6 Vol. 45, No. 4 (July/August 1998), p. 52;
433. and Jan Arveds Trapans, "National Security Concepts in Central and Eastern Europe," NATO Review No. 6 (November/December 1997), pp. 23-2;
434. Pat Towell, "Aspiring NATO Newcomers Face Long Road to Integration," Congressional Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 6 (7 February 1998), p. 275.
435. See Ronald D. Asmus, Richard K. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO Expansion:The Next Steps," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Spring 1995).
436. Albright, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Hearings on NATO Enlargement, 7 October 1997 (http:/frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_senate_hearings&docid=f.46832.wais, p. 2.
437. Anthony Lake, "Laying the Foundation for a New American Century," remarks to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 25 April 1996.
438. See Manuel Pastor and Carol Wise, "The Origins and Sustainability of Mexico's Free Trade Policy," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 459-6;
439. Michael Lusztig, Rising Free Trade: The Politics of Trade in Britain, Canada, Mexico, and the United States (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), chapter five;
440. M. Delal Baer, "Mexico's Second Revolution: Pathways to Liberalization," in Riordan Roett, ed., Political and Economic Liberalization in Mexico: At a Critical Juncture? (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993), pp. 51-2;
441. Nora Lustig, "NAFTA: A Mexican Perspective," SAIS Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 1992), p. 59.
442. See also Jorge G. Castaneda, "Can NAFTA Change Mexico?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4 (September/October 1993), pp. 73-2;
443. Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations (New York:Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 248.
444. For a discussion of NAFTA as a "commitment device" by the Mexican government, see Aaron Tornell and Gerardo Esquivel, "The Political Economy of Mexico's Entry into NAFTA," in Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger, eds., Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade Arrangements (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 27, 54.
445. Guy Poitras and Raymond Robinson, "The Politics of NAFTA in Mexico," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring 1994), p. 7.
446. See Morton Kondracke, "Mexico and the Politics of Free Trade," National Interest, No.(Fall 1991), pp. 36-2;
447. Interview, Robert B. Zoellick, 28 May 1999.
448. Quoted in Smith, Talons of the Eagle, p. 247.
449. On the origins of APEC, see Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1995), chapter three;
450. and Peter Drysdale and Andrew Elek, "APEC: Community-Building in East Asia and the Pacific," in Donald C. Hellmann and Kenneth B. Pyle, eds., From APEC to Xanadu: Creating a Viable Community in the Post-Cold War Pacific (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 37-2;
451. The initial participants were the six ASEAN countries along with Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States. Other countries, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China, joined later.
452. Quoted in Funabashi, Asian Pacific Fusion, p. 58.
453. As early as the summer of 1988, the Bush foreign policy team floated the idea of creating an East Asian finance ministers group that would meet on an ongoing basis to foster policy cooperation on regional economic issues. SeeWalter S. Mossberg and Alan Murray, "Departure of Treasury Secretary BakerWould Bring Halt to Initiative in Asia," Wall Street Journal, 3 August 1988, Section One, p. 22.
454. As economic regionalism gained momentum during this period in Europe, Asia, and the Americas, the Bush administration wanted to be sure it was in as many of them as possible. Economic and political access went hand in hand. Moreover, by being the only major country in multiple regional groupings, the United States would have unique leverage to ensure that regional economic developments were compatible with wider multilateral economic openness. Interview, Robert B. Zoellick, 28 May 1999.
455. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, pp. 44-2;
456. See also Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, eds., Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995).
457. As National Security Advisor Anthony Lake argues, APEC was seen in part as a "device to get the states in East Asia committed to the type of economic relationships that are in everybody's long-term interest." Interview, Anthony Lake, 20 September 1999.
458. For descriptions of the WTO agreement, see Raymond Vernon, "The World Trade Organization: A New Stage in International Trade and Development," Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 329-6;
459. Ernest H. Pregg, Traders in a Brave New World: The Uruguay Round and the Future of the International Trading System (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1995);
460. John H. Jackson, "Managing the Trading System: The World Trade Organization and the Post-Uruguay Round GATT Agenda," in Peter B. Kenen, ed., Managing the World Economy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994), pp. 131-51;
461. Jackson, "TheWorld Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement, and Codes of Conduct," in Susan M. Collins and Barry P. Bosworth, eds., The New GATT: Implications for the United States (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 63-75;
462. and Gilbert R.Winham, "TheWorld Trade Organization: Institution-Building in the Multilateral Trade System," World Economy, Vol. 21, No. 3 (May 1998), pp. 349-6.
463. See Preeg, Traders in a Brave New World, pp. 207-2;
464. Winham, "The World Trade Organization," p. 363.
465. See testimony of U.S. Trade Representative Michael Kantor, Hearings, "Overview of the Results of the Uruguay Round," before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, 16 June 1994 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 9-2;
466. Winham, "The World Trade Organization," pp. 352-2;
467. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 45.
468. Quoted in Brinkley, "Democratic Enlargement," p. 121.
469. Although both the Bush and Clinton administrations pursued enlargement-oriented institution-building strategies, their styles differed. Bush officials focused primarily on regional economic institution building and did not articulate a general post-ColdWar strategy. The Clinton administration picked up many of these regional institution-building policies (NATO expansion and APEC) and articulated a more sweeping and less regionally differentiated grand strategy. See Michael Cox, U.S. Foreign Policy after the ColdWar: Superpower without a Mission? (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995).
470. Interview, Robert B. Zoellick, 28 May 1999.
471. See, for example, John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the ColdWar," International Security, Vol. 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-57;
472. KennethWaltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79;
473. Pierre Hassner, "Europe beyond Partition and Unity: Disintegration or Reconstruction?" International Affairs, Vol. 66 (July 1990), pp. 461-75;
474. Hugh DeSantis, "The Graying of NATO,"Washington Quarterly, Vol. 14 (Autumn 1991), pp. 51-65;
475. Ronald Steel, "NATO's Last Mission," Foreign Policy, No. 74 (Fall 1989), pp. 83-95;
476. Christopher Layne, "Superpower Disengagement," Foreign Policy, No. 78 (Spring 1990), pp. 3-25;
477. and Stephen Walt, "The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America Are Drifting Apart," National Interest, No. 54 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 3-2;
478. Robert Gilpin, "American Policy in the Post-Reagan Era," Daedelus, Vol. 116, No. 3 (Summer 1987), pp. 33-6.
479. Also Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000 (New York: Random House, 1987).
480. For an overview of this view, see Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment:Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-6.
481. See Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-6.
482. For realist efforts to explain this persistence, see William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World."
483. John Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the ColdWar," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 5 (1994/95), pp. 763-2;
484. Roger Cohen, "France to Rejoin Military Command of NATO Alliance," New York Times, 6 December 1995, p. A1.
485. A variety of considerations informed French rethinking of its NATO involvement: a view that a European defense identity could more effectively be promoted from within the alliance rather than from outside, the French experience in the Gulf War and in Bosnia, and opportunities to reduce defense spending.
486. See Geir Lundestad, " 'Empire by Invitation' in the American Century," Diplomatic History, Vol 23, No. 2 (Spring 1999), p. 204.
487. See Roger Cohen, "Uncomfortable with Dependence on U.S., Europe Aims for New Parity," New York Times, 15 June 1999, pp. A1, A14.
488. This rationale for NATO enlargement reinforces the claim made in the last chapter that the alliance was originally supported by its members in part as an institutional structure to bind the allies together and reduce strategic rivalry among them. For a similar argument relating specifically to Germany, see Josef Joffe, "Where Germany Has Never Been Before," National Interest, No. 56 (Summer 1999), pp. 45-2;
489. With the rise of Chinese power in the Asia-Pacific, the persistence of the U.S.-Japan alliance presents less of a puzzle to neorealist theories of order. The end of the Cold War may have actually contributed to Japanese and American worries about security because, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the American security partnership with China is no longer needed.
490. On the notion of semisovereignty, see Peter J. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-Sovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
491. On the importance of European institutions for German political identity and stability, see Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
492. For a discussion of Japanese semisovereignty and the postwar peace constitution, see Masaru Tamamoto, "Reflections on Japan's Postwar State," Daedalus, Vol. 124, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 1-6.
493. Quoted in Thomas A. Schwartz, "The United States and Germany after 1945: Alliances, Transnational Relations, and the Legacy of the Cold War," Diplomatic History, Vol. 19 (Fall 1995), p. 555.
494. Quoted in Jan Perlez, "Larger NATO Seen as Lid on Germany," International Herald Tribune, 8 December 1997.
495. Jeffrey J. Anderson and John B. Goodman, "Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-ColdWar Europe," in Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 34.
496. See remarks by President Clinton and Prime Minister Obuchi at their May 1999 joint press conference. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Press Conference of the President and Prime Minister Obuchi," 3 May 1999.
497. The phenomenon of "increasing returns" to institutions is discussed in Chapter Three.
498. This notion of breakpoint or critical juncture is not developed in the increasing returns literature, but it is implicit in the argument, and it is very important for understanding the path dependency of the 1945 Western settlement.
499. Major or great-power war is a uniquely powerful agent of change in world politics because it tends to destroy and discredit old institutions and force the emergence of a new leading or hegemonic state. Robert Gilpin discusses the possibility that with the rise of nuclear weapons, this sort of pattern of global change may end, thereby leaving in place the existing hegemonic order. See Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Epilogue, pp. 231-2;
500. See Cheryl Shanks, Harold K. Jacobson, and Jeffrey H. Kaplan, "Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992," International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Autumn 1996), pp. 593-6.
501. See Peter I. Hajnal, The G7/G8 System: Evolution, Role and Documentation (Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 1999).
502. On 28 June 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a Serbian freedom fighter, shot and killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand, whose automobile had stopped on a street in Sarajevo.
503. See the discussion by Thomas Schelling on "the power to bind oneself." Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 22-2;
504. Quoted in Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition:The Treaty Fight in Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 133.
505. Sir Oliver Franks, in Listener, 14 June 1956.
506. Quoted in John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement after the Second World War (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 573.
507. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation was established in Paris on 16 April 1948 for the implementation of the Marshall Plan.
508. George Kennan, "Review of Current Trends-U.S. Foreign Policy," Report by the Policy Planning Staff, 24 February 1948. Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), Vol. 1, Part 2, pp. 515, 517.
509. See Adam Przeworski, "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflict," in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
510. The importance of political institutions-of which constitutional structures are the most fundamental-to the mediation and muting of dynamic social forces in evolving societies is stressed by Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
511. For discussions of this process, see Charles Tilly, Durable Inequality (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998);
512. and Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
513. In a lighthearted snapshot of this logic, at a recent meeting of the Trilateral Commission an American participant indicated to a French participant that he was very upset that the Europeans had beaten the Americans to a big airplane deal with China. The French gentlemen responded: "Don't worry, next time it will be your turn."See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 12-2;
514. See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), chapter two.
515. Quoted in Craig R. Whitney, "NATO at 50:With Nations at Odds, Is It a Misalliance?" New York Times, 15 February 1999, p. A7.
516. Robert B. Zoellick, "The United States," in Zoellick, Peter D. Sutherland, and Hisashi Owada, 21st Century Strategies of the Trilateral Countries: In Concert or Conflict? (New York:Trilateral Commission, 1999), p. 5. The Trilateral system refers to the postwar relations among Europe, Japan, and the United States.
517. Super 301 was invoked by the United States in its automobile dispute with Japan in 1995, although an agreement was reached before the American tariffs were imposed. See David E. Sanger, "A Deal on Auto Trade: The Agreement," New York Times, 29 June 1995, p. 1.
518. On the wider pattern of American unilateral trade policy, see Benjamin J. Cohen, " 'Return to Normalcy'? Global Economic Policy at the End of the Century," in Robert J. Lieber, ed., Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century (New York: Longman, 1997), pp. 73-99;
519. and Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), chapter 3.
520. Michael Wines, "Senate Approves Compromise Bill Tightening Curbs on Cuba," New York Times, 6 March 1996, p. 7.
521. David E. Sanger, "Play the Trade Card," New York Times, 17 February 1997, p. 1
522. See Laura Silber, "Divisions Are Deep over New War Crimes Court," Financial Times, 6 April 1998, p. 6.
523. Flora Lewis, "Uncomfortable with U.S. Power, Real or Illusory," International Herald Tribune, 14 May 1999, p. 5.
524. Whitney, "NATO at 50." 22 Anthony Faiola, "Bombing of Yugoslavia Awakens Anti-U.S. Feeling around the World,"Washington Post, 18 May 1999, p. A1;
525. and Carla Anne Robbins, "Fears of U.S. Dominance Overshadow Kosovo Victory," Asian Wall Street Journal, 7 July 1999, p. A1;
526. Robert F. Ellsworth and Michael M. May, "An Overreaching U.S. Spurs FearsWorldwide," Korea Herald, 20 July 1999, p. A2.
527. See also François Heisbourg, "US Hegemony? Perceptions of the US Abroad," paper presented at International Institute for Strategic Studies Conference, San Diego, Cal., 8-11 September 1999.