The monitoring role of insiders

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 359-377

  Drymiotes, George ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Board of directors; Commitment; Corporate governance; Monitoring

Indexed keywords

EID: 35548977569     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.04.003     Document Type: Article

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