Hedge Funds and Chapter 11

Journal of Finance

Volumn 67, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 513-560

  Jiang, Wei ^a   Li, Kai ^b   Wang, Wei ^c  

^a Columbia University ^*  (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^c QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859128141     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: 15406261     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01724.x     Document Type: Article

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