Internal managerial promotions: Insider incentives and CEO succession

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 18, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 1337-1353

  Mobbs, Shawn ^a   Raheja, Charu G ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

^b WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c TriageLogic Management   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO succession; Compensation; Firm performance; Organization structure; Tournament

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867135630     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.09.001     Document Type: Article

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