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Volumn 24, Issue 7, 2011, Pages 2358-2394

Corporate governance propagation through overlapping directors

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 79959694247     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhr034     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (144)

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