Consensus in diverse corporate boards

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 715-747

  Baranchuk, Nina ^a   Dybvig, Philip H ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 59449091387     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhn052     Document Type: Article

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