Target-hardening decisions based on uncertain multiattribute terrorist utility

Decision Analysis

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 286-302

  Wang, Chen ^a   Bier, Vicki M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayes' method; Game theory; Homeland security; Multiattribute utility; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

EID: 83755228811     PISSN: 15458490     EISSN: 15458504     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/deca.1110.0218     Document Type: Article

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