Robust Allocation of a Defensive Budget Considering an Attacker's Private Information

Risk Analysis

Volumn 32, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 930-943

  Nikoofal, Mohammad E ^a   Zhuang, Jun ^b  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b State University of New York   (United States)

Author keywords

Defender attacker game; Defense resource allocation; Private information; Robust optimization

Indexed keywords

CRITICAL ATTRIBUTES; DEFENDER-ATTACKER GAME; DISTRIBUTION-FREE; HOME LAND SECURITY; KEY FEATURE; MODELING UNCERTAINTIES; PRIVATE INFORMATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION DECISION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRATEGIES; ROBUST DECISIONS; ROBUST OPTIMIZATION;

BUDGET CONTROL; GAME THEORY; OPTIMIZATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SECURITY SYSTEMS; UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS;

SECURITY OF DATA;

ACCURACY ASSESSMENT; HOMEOWNER; NUMERICAL MODEL; OPTIMIZATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS; VALUATION;

ARTICLE; ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; TERRORISM; THEORETICAL MODEL; UNCERTAINTY; UNITED STATES;

MODELS, THEORETICAL; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SECURITY MEASURES; TERRORISM; UNCERTAINTY; UNITED STATES;

EID: 84860431639     PISSN: 02724332     EISSN: 15396924     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01702.x     Document Type: Article

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