Optimal stopping analysis of a radiation detection system to protect cities from a nuclear terrorist attack

Risk Analysis

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 353-371

  Atkinson, Michael P ^b   Cao, Zheng ^c   Wein, Lawrence M ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Stanford University   (United States)

^c STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Homeland security; Stackelberg game; Stochastic dynamic programming

Indexed keywords

BOMBS (ORDNANCE); DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING; RISK ANALYSIS;

HOMELAND SECURITY; STACKELBERG GAME; STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING;

RADIATION DETECTORS;

NATIONAL SECURITY; NUCLEAR EXPLOSION; SENSOR; STOCHASTICITY; TERRORISM;

ARTICLE; ATOMIC WARFARE; BIOSENSOR; HOME SAFETY; NUCLEAR SAFETY; RADIATION DETECTION; RADIOSENSITIVITY; TERRORISM;

ACCIDENTS, RADIATION; BAYES THEOREM; CITIES; DISASTER PLANNING; NUCLEAR WARFARE; PROBABILITY; RADIATION; RADIATION MONITORING; RADIATION PROTECTION; SECURITY MEASURES; TERRORISM;

EID: 41549107359     PISSN: 02724332     EISSN: 15396924     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2008.01023.x     Document Type: Article

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