Modeling Arbitrary Layers of Continuous-Level Defenses in Facing with Strategic Attackers

Risk Analysis

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 533-547

  Golalikhani, Mohsen ^a   Zhuang, Jun ^a  

^a the State University of New York   (United States)

Author keywords

Defender optimization; Game theory; Homeland security; Resource allocation

Indexed keywords

ARBITRARY LAYERS; DEFENDER OPTIMIZATION; DEFENSE ALLOCATION; FUNCTIONAL SIMILARITY; GAME-THEORETIC MODEL; GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY; HOMELAND SECURITY; NUMERICAL EXAMPLE; OPTIMAL ASSIGNMENT; UNIT COST;

NUMERICAL METHODS; OPTIMIZATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SECURITY SYSTEMS;

GAME THEORY;

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; EQUILIBRIUM; GAME THEORY; LITERATURE REVIEW; NUMERICAL MODEL; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SECURITY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

ARTICLE; GAME; ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; THEORETICAL MODEL;

GAME THEORY; MODELS, THEORETICAL; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SECURITY MEASURES;

EID: 79952695711     PISSN: 02724332     EISSN: 15396924     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01531.x     Document Type: Article

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