Reasons for Secrecy and Deception in Homeland-Security Resource Allocation

Risk Analysis

Volumn 30, Issue 12, 2010, Pages 1737-1743

  Zhuang, Jun ^a   Bier, Vicki M ^b  

^a STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^b University of Wisconsin Madison   (United States)

Author keywords

Deception; Game theory; Private information; Secrecy; Truthful disclosure

Indexed keywords

DECEPTION; FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS; PRIVATE INFORMATION; SECRECY; SECURITY CONTEXT; TRUTHFUL DISCLOSURE;

RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

GAME THEORY;

FUTURE PROSPECT; GAME THEORY; RESEARCH WORK; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SECURITY THREAT;

ARTICLE; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; DECEPTION; GOVERNMENT; HUMAN; ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; UNITED STATES;

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; DECEPTION; GOVERNMENT AGENCIES; HUMANS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SECURITY MEASURES; UNITED STATES;

EID: 78649762419     PISSN: 02724332     EISSN: 15396924     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01455.x     Document Type: Article

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