Ethics and efficiency in organizations

International Journal of Social Economics

Volumn 23, Issue 9, 1996, Pages 15-40

  Hausken, Kjell ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIETIES   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008704336     PISSN: 03068293     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/03068299610124298     Document Type: Review

References (24)

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