Debt, performance-based incentives, and firm performance

Financial Management

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 37-51

  McConaughy, Daniel L ^a   Mishra, Chandra S ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039120840     PISSN: 00463892     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3665988     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. Abowd, J., 1990, "Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate Performance?" Industrial and Labor Relations Review (February), 52-73.
2. Black, F. and J. Cox , 1976, "Valuing Corporate Securities: Some Effects of Indenture Provisions," Journal of Finance (May), 351-67.
3. Bizjak, J., J. Brickley and J. Coles, 1993. "Stock-Based Incentive Compensation and Investment Behavior," Journal of Accounting and Economics (January/April/July), 349-72.
4. Chung, K. and C. Charoenwong, 1991, "Investment Options, Assets in Place, and the Risk of Stock," Financial Management (Autumn), 21-33.
5. Collins, M., D. Blackwell, and J. Sinkey, 1995, "The Relationship between Corporate Compensation Policies and Investment Opportunities: Empirical Evidence for Large Bank Holding Companies." Financial Management (Autumn), 40-53.
6. Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn, 1985, "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy (December), 155-77.
7. Fama, E., 1976, Foundations of Finance, New York, NY, Basic Books.
8. Galai, D. and R. Masulis, 1976, "The Option Pricing Model and the Risk Factor of Stock," Journal of Financial Economics (January/March), 53-81.
9. Gaver, J. and K. Gaver, 1995, "Compensation Policy and the Investment Opportunity Set," Financial Management (Spring), 19-32.
10. Gibbons, R. and K. Murphy, 1990, "Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers," Industrial and Labor Relations Review (February), 30-51.
11. Grossman, S. and O. Hart, 1983, "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica (Vol. 51), 7-46.
12. Heckman, J., 1979, "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica (Vol. 47), 153-61.
13. Hull, R. and R. Moellenberndt, 1994, "Bank Debt Reduction Announcements and Negative Signaling," Financial Management (Summer), 21-30.
14. Holthausen, R. and D. Larker, 1993, "Organizational Structure and Financial Performance," The Wharton School, Working Paper.
15. Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, 1976, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," Journal of Financial Economics (October), 305-60.
16. Jensen, M. and K. Murphy, 1990a, "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy (May/June), 225-64.
17. Jensen, M. and K. Murphy, 1990b, "A New Survey of Executive Compensation: Full Survey and Technical Appendix," Harvard Business School Working Paper 90-067.
18. Jensen, M. and K. Murphy, 1990c, "CEO Incentives - It's Not How Much You Pay, but How," Harvard Business Review (May/June), 138-153.
19. Jensen, M. and C. Smith, 1985, "Stakeholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Application of Agency Theory," in E. Altman and M. Subramanyam eds., The Modern Theory of Corporate Finance, Homewood, IL, Irwin.
20. Lee, L., 1982, "Some Approaches to the Correction of Selectivity Bias," Review of Economic Studies (Vol. 49), 355-72.
21. Lippert, R. and W. Moore, 1994, "Compensation Contracts of Chief Executive Officers: Determinants of Pay-Performance Sensitivity," The Journal of Financial Research (Fall), 321-332.
22. Lippert, R. and W. Moore, 1995, "Monitoring versus Bonding: Shareholder Rights and Management Compensation," Financial Management (Autumn), 54-61.
23. Maddala, G., 1983. Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, Econometric Society Monographs in Quantitative Economics, New York, NY, Cambridge University Press.
24. Maddala, G. , 1991, "On the Use of Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables Models in Accounting Research," University of Florida Working Paper.
25. Murphy, K., 1985, "Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics (April), 11-42.
26. Murphy, K., 1992, "Executive Compensation in Corporate America: 1992," in Executive Compensation in Corporate America '92, pp. 3-6, United Shareholders Association.
27. Myers, S., 1977, "Determinants of Corporate Borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics (November), 147-75.
28. Pavlik, E., T. Scott and P. Tiessen, 1993, "Executive Compensation: Issues and Research," Journal of Accounting Literature (Vol. 12), 131-89.
29. Prowse, S., 1990, "Institutional Investment Patterns and Corporate Financial Behavior in the United States and Japan," Journal of Financial Economics (June), 43-66.
30. Reagan, P. and R. Stultz, 1983, "Risk Sharing, Labor Contracts, and Capital Markets," University of Rochester Working Paper.
31. Ross, S., 1973, "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review (March), 135-39.
32. Shehata, M., 1991, "Self-Selection Bias and the Economic Consequences of Accounting Regulation : An Application of Two-Stage Switching Regression to SFAS No. 2," The Accounting Review (October), 768-87.
33. Shome, D. and S. Singh, 1995, "Firm Value and External Blockholdings," Financial Management, (Winter), 3-14.
34. Smith, C. and J. Warner, 1979, "On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants," Journal of Financial Economics (June), 117-61.
35. Smith, C. and R. Watts, 1992, "The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies," Journal of Financial Economics (December), 263-92.
36. Sloan, R., 1993, "Accounting Earnings and Top Executive Compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics (April), 55-100.
37. Tosi, H., and L. Gomez-Mejia, 1989, "The Decoupling of CEO Pay and Performance: An Agency Theoretic Perspective," Administrative Sciences Quarterly (June), 169-89.
38. White, H., 1980, "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica (May), 817-38.