Ineffective corporate governance: Director busyness and board committee memberships

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 33, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 819-828

  Jiraporn, Pornsit ^a   Singh, Manohar ^b   Lee, Chun I ^c  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b WILLAMETTE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Board committees; Corporate governance; Multiple directorships; Sarbanes Oxley act

Indexed keywords

EID: 60749101480     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.09.020     Document Type: Article

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