Dynamic learning in behavioral games: A hidden Markov mixture of experts approach

Quantitative Marketing and Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 475-503

  Ansari, Asim ^a   Montoya, Ricardo ^b   Netzer, Oded ^a  

^a The Sanford C Bernstein Co Center for Leadership and Ethics   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHILE   (Chile)

Author keywords

Bayesian estimation; Behavioral game theory; Experimental economics; Hidden Markov mixture of experts model; Learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84871801354     PISSN: 15707156     EISSN: 1573711X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11129-012-9125-8     Document Type: Article

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