Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 74, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 208-221

  Haruvy, Ernan ^a   Stahl, Dale O ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

Experiments; Learning; Transference

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855188514     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.001     Document Type: Article

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