Aspiration-based and reciprocity-based rules in learning dynamics for symmetric normal-form games

Journal of Mathematical Psychology

Volumn 46, Issue 5, 2002, Pages 531-553

  Stahl, Dale O ^a   Haruvy, Ernan ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Aspiration; Games; Learning; Reciprocity; Rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036797234     PISSN: 00222496     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jmps.2001.1409     Document Type: Article

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