Authority, risk, and performance incentives: Evidence from division manager positions inside firms

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 55, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 169-196

  Wulf, Julie ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34147129013     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: 14676451     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2007.00307.x     Document Type: Article

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