Promotions, turnover, and performance evaluation: Evidence from the careers of division managers

Accounting Review

Volumn 84, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1119-1143

  Cichello, Michael S ^a   Fee, C Edward ^b   Hadlock, Charles J ^b   Sonti, Ramana ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c INDIAN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS   (India)

Author keywords

Division managers; Internal labor markets; Performance measurement; Promotions; Turnover

Indexed keywords

EID: 69549096526     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2009.84.4.1119     Document Type: Article

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