The CEO pay slice

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 102, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 199-221

  Bebchuk, Lucian A ^a,b   Cremers, K J Martijn ^c   Peyer, Urs C ^d  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c YALE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT   (United States)

^d INSEAD   (France)

Author keywords

Acquisitions; Backdating; CEO; CEO chair; CEO turnover; Corporate governance; Empire building; Entrenchment; Executive compensation; Independent directors; Internal pay equity; Opportunistic timing; Options; Pay distribution; Tobin's q; Variability of returns

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860390262     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.006     Document Type: Article

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