Deficits, debt, and democracy: Wrestling with tragedy on the fiscal commons

Deficits, Debt, and Democracy: Wrestling with Tragedy on the Fiscal Commons

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages

  Wagner, Richard E ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84864303441     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9780857934604     Document Type: Book

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