Evolution in state governance structures: Unintended consequences of state tax and expenditure limitations

Political Research Quarterly

Volumn 57, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 189-196

  Bowler, Shaun ^a   Donovan, Todd ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b WESTERN WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3543141727     PISSN: 10659129     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/106591290405700201     Document Type: Review

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