A theory of entangled political economy, with application to TARP and NRA

Public Choice

Volumn 148, Issue 1-2, 2011, Pages 45-66

  Smith, Adam ^a   Wagner, Richard E ^a   Yandle, Bruce ^b,c  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CLEMSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bailout; Constitutional economics; Credit markets; Economic calculation; Political economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956266376     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9645-2     Document Type: Article

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