The organizational architecture of nonprofit governance: Economic calculation within an ecology of enterprises

Public Organization Review

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 57-68

  Auteri, Monica ^a   Wagner, Richard E ^b  

^a SAPIENZA UNIVERSITY OF ROME   (Italy)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency; Economic calculation; Entrepreneurship; Governance; Nonprofit firms

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947380914     PISSN: 15667170     EISSN: 15737098     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11115-006-0027-7     Document Type: Article

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