States and the crafting of souls: Mind, society, and fiscal sociology

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 59, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 516-524

  Wagner, Richard E ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Constitutional economics; Endogenous preferences; Fiscal institutions; Pareto; Public enterprise

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644804494     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.06.004     Document Type: Article

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