Municipal corporations, economic calculation, and political pricing: Exploring a theoretical antinomy

Public Choice

Volumn 149, Issue 1-2, 2011, Pages 151-165

  Wagner, Richard E ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Competition among governments; Emergence; Municipal corporations; Political pricing

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052493152     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9831-x     Document Type: Article

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