Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2001, Pages 18-28

  Lehmann, Benny ^a   Lehmann, Daniel ^b   Nisan, Noam ^b  

^a Digital Fuel ^*

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION THEORY; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; ECONOMICS;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; DECREASING MARGINAL UTILITIES;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 0011986321     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/501158.501161     Document Type: Conference Paper

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