Knapsack auctions

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1083-1092

  Aggarwal, Gagan ^a,b   Hartline, Jason D ^c  

^a GOOGLE INC   (United States)

^b Stanford University   (United States)

^c MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONSTANT FRACTION; KNAPSACK PROBLEM; PRIVATE VALUATIONS;

ALGORITHMS; COMMERCE; INTERNET; SEARCH ENGINES; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 33244490106     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1109557.1109677     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (16)

1. Z. Abrams. Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets. In Proceedings of the 17th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2006.
2. M.-F. Balcan, A. Blum, J. Hartline, and Y. Mansour. Mechanism Design via Machine Learning. In Proc. of the 46th IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science, 2005.
3. A. Blum and J. Hartline. Near-optimal online auctions. In Proceedings of the 16th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 1156-1163, 2005.
4. C. Borgs, J. Chayes, N. Immorlica, M. Mahdian, and A. Saberi. Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 44-51, 2005.
5. E. H. Clarke. Multipart Pricing of Public Goods. Public Choice. 11:17-33, 1971.
6. A. Fiat, A. Goldberg, J. Hartline, and A. Karlin. Competitive generalized auctions. In Proceedings of the 34th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pages 72-81, 2002.
7. A. Goldberg and J. Hartline. Envy-free auctions for digital goods. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 29-35, 2003.
8. A. Goldberg and J. Hartline. Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents. In Proceedings of the 16th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 620-629, 2005.
9. A. Goldberg, J. Hartline, A. Karlin, M. Saks, and A. Wright. Competitive auctions. Games and Economic Behavior. Submitted for publication. An earlier version available as InterTrust Technical Report STAR-TR-99-01.
10. A. Goldberg, J. Hartline, and A. Wright. Competitive auctions and digital goods. In Proceedings of the 12th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 735-744, 2001.
11. T. Groves. Incentives in Teams. Econometrica, 41:617-631, 1973.
12. V. Guruswami, J. Hartline, A. Karlin, D. Kempe, C. Kenyon, and F. McSherry. On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing. In Proceedings of the 16th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 1164-1173, 2005.
13. A. Mehta, A. Saberi, U. Vazirani, and V. Vazirani. Adwords and generalized online matching. In Proceedings of the 46th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2005.
14. A. Mu'alem and N. Nisan. Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 18th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 379-384, 2002.
15. R. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6:58-73, 1981.
16. W. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. J. of Finance, 16:8-37, 1961.