The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 149-158

  Chawla, Shuchi ^a   Malec, David L ^a   Sivan, Balasubramanian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

bayesian mechanism design; lottery; randomness; revenue

Indexed keywords

BAYESIAN; COMMON-BASE; CONSTANT FACTORS; DETERMINISTIC MECHANISM; DIFFERENT SERVICES; EXPECTED REVENUE; MECHANISM DESIGN; MULTI-DIMENSIONAL CASE; MULTIPLE AGENTS; NATURAL MODELS; OPTIMAL MECHANISM; POSITIVE CORRELATIONS; RANDOMIZED MECHANISM; SINGLE-AGENT; VALUE MODEL;

BAYESIAN NETWORKS; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; OPTIMIZATION; RANDOM PROCESSES;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 77954697904     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1807342.1807366     Document Type: Conference Paper

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