Revenue maximization with a single sample

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 129-138

  Dhangwatnotai, Peerapong ^a   Roughgarden, Tim ^a   Yan, Qiqi ^a  

^a Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

auctions; mechanism design; revenue maximization

Indexed keywords

APRIORI; ATTRIBUTE VALUES; EXPECTED REVENUE; HAZARD RATES; MAXIMIZING AUCTIONS; MECHANISM DESIGN; OPTIMAL WELFARE; PARAMETER SETTING; RESERVE PRICE; REVENUE MAXIMIZATION; SINGLE SAMPLE;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MACHINE DESIGN;

OPTIMIZATION;

EID: 77954744342     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1807342.1807364     Document Type: Conference Paper

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