Optimal mechanism design and money burning

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 75-84

  Hartline, Jason D ^a   Roughgarden, Tim ^b  

^a Northwestern University   (United States)

^b Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

Algorithms; Economics; Theory

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; BENCHMARKING; COMMERCE; ECONOMICS; MACHINE DESIGN;

DESIGN AND ANALYSIS; IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS; OPTIMAL MECHANISM DESIGNS; PRIMARY CONTRIBUTION; SELF-INTERESTED AGENTS; SINGLE-PARAMETER AGENTS; THEORY; WORST-CASE ANALYSIS;

COMPUTATION THEORY;

EID: 57049175510     PISSN: 07378017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1374376.1374390     Document Type: Conference Paper

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