Two randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4627 LNCS, Issue , 2007, Pages 89-103

  Dobzinski, Shahar ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION THEORY; NUMERICAL METHODS; POLYNOMIALS; PROBLEM SOLVING; RANDOM PROCESSES;

APPROXIMATION RATIO; COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; RANDOMIZED MECHANISMS; SUBADDITIVE BIDDERS;

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS;

EID: 38049012993     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-74208-1_7     Document Type: Conference Paper

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