Originalism in practice

Indiana Law Journal

Volumn 87, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 1183-1245

  Rosenthal, Lawrence ^a  

^a CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84861822439     PISSN: 00196665     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (394)

1. 554 U. S. 570 (2008).
2. U. S. CONST, amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.").
3. Heller, 554 U. S. at 625.
4. (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 731 (1931)) (citation omitted).
5. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 599 (2004). Although this definition will suffice for present purposes, Lawrence Solum has provided a helpful elaboration: [M]ost or almost all originalists agree that original meaning was fixed or determined at the time each provision of the constitution was framed and ratified. We might call this idea the fixation thesis. It is no surprise that originalists agree on the fixation thesis. The term "originalism" was coined to describe a family of textualist and intentionalist approaches to constitutional interpretation and construction that were associated with phrases like "original intentions", "original meaning", and "original understanding." These phrases and the word "originalist" share the root word "origin. " The idea that meaning is fixed at the time of origination for each constitutional provision serves as the common denominator for all of these expressions. Thus, the fixation thesis might be described as a core idea around which all or almost all originalist theories organize themselves.
6. Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12, 33 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) [hereafter THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM] (emphasis in original).
7. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 284-398 (1988);
8. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 340-65 (1996);
9. Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 456-74 (1984);
10. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B. U. L. REV. 204, 209-22 (1980);
11. Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 351-58 (1989);
12. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985).
13. For responses to these criticisms from advocates of original-intention - originalism, see, for example, Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 5, at 87, 89-94;
14. Raoul Berger, The Founders' Views-According to Jefferson Powell, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1055-76 (1989);
15. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 236-84 (1988);
16. Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77 (1988);
17. Earl M. Maltz, The Failure of Attacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 43 (1987).
18. For a useful typology of the various approaches to originalist constitutional interpretation, see Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L. J. 239, 247-67 (2009).
19. For useful discussions of the manner in which originalism has revolutionized the Court's jurisprudence in these areas, see, for example, Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1044-64, 1068-69 (2006);
20. Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L. J. 183, 189-99 (2005);
21. John C. Eastman, Politics and the Court: Did the Supreme Court Really Move Left Because of Embarrassment over Bush v. Gore?, 94 GEO. L. J. 1475, 1476-81 (2006);
22. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 217, 231-32 (2010);
23. and Antonin Scalia, Foreword, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 871, 871-72 (2008).
24. A typology of nonoriginalism can be derived from Philip Bobbin's modalities of constitutional argument, which include historical, textual, prudential, ethical, structural, and doctrinal argument. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-119 (1982). Of these modalities, only the first is originalist. Even historical argument, however, does not qualify as originalist under the definition offered above if it is based on understandings of constitutional text that emerged after the framing era, as is sometimes the case.
25. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1797-1812 (2007);
26. Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33-76 (1998); (Pubitemid 128443698)
27. Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE L. J. 2115, 2138-41 (1999).
28. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 433 (1920).
29. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 35-37 (2011);
30. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 92-117 (2004);
31. GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 67-90 (1992);
32. MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 28-53 (1994);
33. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 160-212 (1999);
34. Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1103-07 (1991);
35. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L. J. 541, 550-59 (1994);
36. Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of "This Constitution", 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1186-259 (1987);
37. Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the "Black Ink" of the Framers' Intention, 100 HARV. L. REV. 751, 756-60 (1987);
38. Christopher R. Green, "This Constitution": Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis for Textual Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607, 1641-67 (2009);
39. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L. J. 1113, 1127-48 (2003);
40. Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes... and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L. J. 1823, 1833-36 (1997);
41. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1278-87 (1997);
42. Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not to), 115 YALE L. J. 2037, 2056-62 (2006);
43. Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism's Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 541-45 (1998) (reviewing RAKOVE, supra note 6);
44. Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 512-14 (1988);
45. Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 940-55 (2009).
46. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613 (1999).
47. For accounts of the turn toward originalism among legal scholars see, for example, DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 20-154 (2005);
48. and JOHNATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 101-216 (2005).
49. Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 283, 288-91 (1996);
50. Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1020-29 (1992);
51. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989);
52. Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 105-06 (1989);
53. Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 38-42 (Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2011) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM].
54. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143-60 (1990);
55. Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1121-26 (1998);
56. Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1440, 1444-46 (2007);
57. Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an "Ism", 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 301, 307-08 (1996);
58. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1132-37 (1998);
59. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION];
60. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 82-88 (2009);
61. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L. J. 1693, 1698-733 (2010).
62. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 115-18 (2005);
63. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING DOCUMENT DOESN'T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 20-32 (2009);
64. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1, 38-68 (2009);
65. Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1025 (2010);
66. Tara Smith, Originalism's Misplaced Fidelity: "Original" Meaning Is Not Objective, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 25-53 (2009).
67. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 32-39 (2001);
68. Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 388-91 (1997); (Pubitemid 127435090)
69. Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 187-202 (2008);
70. Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can. Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482, 1499-501 (1985);
71. Mark S. Stein, Originalism and Original Exclusions, 98 KY. L. J. 397, 448-56 (2009-10);
72. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 928-34 (1996). (Pubitemid 126408724)
73. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE'S VIEW 76-78 (2010);
74. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 11-21 (2002);
75. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 18-21 (2010);
76. Robert W. Bennett, Originalism and the Living American Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM, supra note 13, at 78, 87-114;
77. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 92-103 (1989);
78. Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 907, 911-13 (2008);
79. Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 277-82 (2005);
80. Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 437, 440-41 (1996).
81. Scott W. Howe, Slavery as Punishment: Original Public Meaning, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and the Neglected Clause in the Thirteenth Amendment, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 983, 1019-32 (2009);
82. Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 358-61 (2007);
83. Adam M. Samaha, Originalism's Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295, 1331-49 (2008).
84. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U. S. 579, 593 (1993).
85. Cf. Lawrence M. Friedman, Law Reviews and Legal Scholarship: Some Comments, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 661, 668 (1998)
86. About the only effort along these lines in the literature to date is a study of the Supreme Court's federalism decisions demonstrating that the use of originalism fails to eliminate ideological differences among Members of the Court. See Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court's Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217 (2004).
87. Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L. J. 713, 749-55 (2011);
88. Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L. J. 1765, 1796-99 (1997); (Pubitemid 127437019)
89. Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673, 734-36 (1963);
90. Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 707, 722-24 (2011);
91. Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 65, 71-73;
92. see also STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY 131 (2004)
93. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 574-77 (1964).
94. See, e.g., SOTIROS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 155-70 (2007);
95. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 27-42, 111-18 (2001);
96. GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S. KARLAN & CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION 25-40 (2010);
97. KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 50-58 (2006);
98. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 8-19 (1991);
99. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 23, 25-32 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990);
100. Thomas C Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 709-10, 714-17 (1975).
101. For present purposes, Professor Solum's definition of vague or ambiguous text is helpful: "Vagueness: A term or phrase is vague if and only if it admits of borderline (or uncertain) cases";
102. and "Ambiguity: A term or phrase is ambiguous in the strict or philosophical sense when it has more than one sense or meaning." Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 415 (2009) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
103. Grégoire C. N. Webber, Originalism's Constitution, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 5, at 147, 173-76.
104. For a more general discussion of the distinction between interpretation and construction, see Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 101-08 (2010).
105. U. S. CONST, amend. IV. Its drafting history sheds little light on the original meaning of this phrase. The Amendment began as a single clause forbidding unreasonable search and seizure "by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized."
106. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 223 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997). The text was changed during debate in the House to create a freestanding clause prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure, and in the most complete analysis of the limited historical materials, Thomas Davies concluded that the alteration was intended to do no more than phrase the prohibition on general warrants in an imperative fashion because of the paucity of evidence that anyone intended to make a substantive change to the original proposal.
107. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 716-24 (1999). That view may well be correct as a matter of congressional intent, but the inference that Professor Davies draws from the legislative history is of little significance in determining the original public meaning of the proposal-at least absent evidence that the public or at least the ratifiers were aware of a congressional intent to preserve the substance of the original proposal in a two-clause format. There is, however, virtually no surviving evidence that sheds any light on the understanding of the Fourth Amendment in the ratifying states.
108. See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602-1791, at 712-23 (2009).
109. David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1781 (2000).
110. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 129, 135.
111. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 758-72 (2009).
112. See John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378-81 (2007). Others similarly contend that framing-era practices and understandings provide potent evidence of original meaning.
113. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 1654-55 (1997);
114. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525-38 (2003);
115. John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 172-74 (1996).
116. Steven D. Smith, Reply to Koppelman: Originalism and the (Merely) Human Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 189, 194-99 (2010).
117. 347 U. S. 483 (1954).
118. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1885-93 (1995).
119. Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brow® Do for You?: Neutral Principles and the Struggle over the Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L. J. 1049, 1060 (2009).
120. Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 423-26 (1995).
121. But see Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1092-105 (1995) (arguing that Brown can be reconciled with framingera understandings by noting that majorities in Reconstruction-era Congresses expressed opposition to segregation during consideration of what became the Civil Rights Act of 1875, though admittedly not the requisite two-thirds majority to amend the Constitution).
122. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 346-49 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
123. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U. S. 62, 95-96 n. 1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia added that support for segregation was not unbroken in the framing era since segregation was challenged in some quarters and denounced by Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Plessy.
124. U. S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1.
125. 163 U. S. 537 (1896).
126. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33 (1959) (emphasis in original)
127. (quoting Plessy, 163 U. S. at 551). Justice Scalia's position is even more puzzling because when it comes to segregation by sex, he thinks that framing-era practice is properly consulted.
128. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 568-70 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Equal Protection Clause, however, offers its protections to every "person", without textual reference to either race or sex. It is therefore hard to understand how the text could be regarded as unambiguous as to race but ambiguous as to sex, requiring reference to framing-era practice for the latter but not the former.
129. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2833-36 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (First Amendment Free Speech Clause);
130. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723, 843-49 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Suspension of Habeas Corpus Clause);
131. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 595-98 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Due Process Clause);
132. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U. S. 668, 687-90 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (First Amendment Free Speech Clause);
133. United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 568-70 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Equal Protection Clause);
134. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 980-85 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment);
135. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S. 44, 60-66 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure);
136. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U. S. 62, 95-97 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (First Amendment Free Speech Clause).
137. To be sure, the difficulty of assessing historical evidence is sometimes great, and that may pose considerable problems for originalism. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020(2010), for example, eight Justices rejected an argument that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause made the protections of the first eight amendments enforceable against the states, in significant part because of uncertainty about the Clause's original meaning.
138. See Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 63-66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
139. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1631, 1644-51 (2009);
140. 217 U. S. 349 (1910).
141. U. S. CONST, amend. VIII.
142. Weems, 217 U. S. at 362-65.
143. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 990-92 (1991) (plurality opinion).
144. 520 U. S. 681 (1997).
145. 553 U. S. 723 (2008).
146. Brown v. Bd. of Educ, 347 U. S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
147. 423 U. S. 411 (1976).
148. See Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 604-14 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
149. 471 U. S. 1 (1985).
150. Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1188.
151. U. S. CONST, amend. VII.
152. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U. S. 687, 708 (1999);
153. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U. S. 340, 347-52 (1998);
154. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U. S. 370, 376 (1996);
155. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U. S. 531, 533-34 (1970).
156. For contrasting views of the original meaning of the Seventh Amendment, see, for example, AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 89-93 (1998) (Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury in federal court only when a jury is available in state court);
157. Stanton D. Krauss, The Original Understanding of the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 407, 479-83 (1999) (Seventh Amendment leaves federal jury rights to congressional discretion);
158. and Rachael E. Schwartz, "Everything Depends on How You Draw the Lines": An Alternative Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 599, 616-29 (1996) (same).
159. For similar discussions, see, for example, RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 291-94 (1996);
160. and Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1170-71 (1993).
161. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
162. Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L. J. 569, 591-617 (1998). (Pubitemid 128429255)
163. Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the "Challenge of Change": Abduced-Principle Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 927, 952 (2009)
164. (quoting FOREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 293 (1985)).
165. To similar effect, see William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 857-58 (1995).
166. 526 U. S. 295 (1999).
167. To similar effect, see, for example, Virginia v. Moore, 553 U. S. 164, 168 (2008) (Scalia, J.).
168. 533 U. S. 27 (2001).
169. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 463-66 (1928)
170. overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967).
171. Kyllo, 533 U. S. at 31.
172. See, e.g., Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1996).
173. 515 U. S. 646 (1995).
174. (quoting Skinner v. Railway Lab. Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U. S. 602, 619 (1989)).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 418-21 (1976);
176. Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions in Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 323-24 (2002).
177. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U. S. 366, 380-81 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
178. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2655-56 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
179. Cf Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2751-59 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that framing-era practice recognizing broad parental authority means that merchants have no First Amendment right to communicate with children except through their parents).
180. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 653 (1995)
181. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 873 (1987)).
182. Cf. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U. S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) ("It is a dangerous fiction to pretend that parents simply delegate their authority... to public school authorities. It is even more dangerous to assume that such a delegation of authority somehow strips public school authorities of their status as agents of the State. Most parents, realistically, have no choice but to send their children to a public school and little ability to influence what occurs in the school").
183. Acton, 515 U. S. at 655-56. Similarly, in his opinion of the Court rejecting Justice Thomas's analogy to the broad scope of framing-era parental authority when assessing the First Amendment rights of minors, Justice Scalia refused to rely on that framing-era practice because it involved legal recognition of the scope of parental authority rather than direct governmental restrictions on the ability of minors to obtain material otherwise protected by the First Amendment.
184. See Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. at 2736 n. 3.
185. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U. S. 366, 382 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that since the framing era "concealed weapons capable of harming the interrogator quickly and from beyond arm's reach have become common-which might alter the judgment of what is 'reasonable' under the original standard");
186. California v. Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[I]t may even be that changes in the surrounding legal rules (for example, elimination of the common-law rule that reasonable, good-faith belief was no defense to absolute liability for trespass...), may make a warrant indispensable to reasonableness where it once was not." (citations omitted)).
187. 495 U. S. 604 (1990).
188. (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 529 (1884)).
189. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
190. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
191. E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 751-52 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
192. For a useful analysis of Justice Thomas's originalism that notes the difference in his approach to questions involving race and other issues, see SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE THOMAS 193-94 (1999).
193. For an argument along these lines, see Note, Original Meaning and Its Limits, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1279, 1292-1300 (2007).
194. Brown v. Bd. of Educ, 347 U. S. 483, 489-93 (1954).
195. 408 U. S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
196. 410 U. S. 113 (1973)
197. modified, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992).
198. 539 U. S. 558 (2003).
199. Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 131-35.
200. 384 U. S. 436 (1966).
201. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1419-29 (1997).
202. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 357, 370-75 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995);
203. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment on Professor Lessig's Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1436-38 (1997);
204. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 941-44 (2003).
205. For a recent explication of Kyllo as reflecting an effort to maintain the framing-era equilibrium between security and order, see Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 496-99 (2011).
206. See Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 185-88.
207. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27, 34 (2001).
208. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 149-50 (1999).
209. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
210. (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (C. P. 1765)).
211. (quoting Kyllo, 533 U. S. at 34 (brackets in original)).
212. Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 410 (2007);
213. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 385-89 (2007);
214. Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin's Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 668-72 (2009);
215. Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra note 14, at 115, 119;
216. Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 555, 580-82 (2006);
217. Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 557-60 (2009);
218. Aileen Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional Interpretation, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 255, 271-79 (2002);
219. James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1538-42 (2011);
220. Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 5, at 223, 234-36.
221. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 n. 3 (2012) (emphasis in original).
222. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1743-47 (1996);
223. Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B. U. L. REV. 895, 966-72 (2002);
224. See Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Original Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 719-25 (2009).
225. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 25 (2001).
226. For an elaboration, see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47 (2006).
227. Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 677 (1991) ("a constitutional provision's 'objective meaning' to the public at the time the provision was ratified" (emphasis omitted)). Indeed, some semantic originalists go as far as contending that in assessing original meaning, substantial weight should be afforded to longstanding or framing-era practice as providing powerful evidence of original meaning.
228. 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
229. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 312-25 (2007).
230. Wayte v. United States, 470 U. S. 598, 610 (1985)
231. (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279 (1979)).
232. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 271-72 (1993).
233. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1016-28 (1984);
234. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L. J. 1281, 1311-24 (1991);
235. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 348-80 (1992);
236. Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31-44 (1992).
237. See, e.g., Erika Bachiochi, Embodied Equality: Debunking Equal Protection Arguments for Abortion Rights, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 889, 907-46 (2011);
238. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1009 n. 35 (2003).
239. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ, 347 U. S. 483, 488-95 (1954).
240. Conversely, Professor Balkin seems entirely willing to rely on original expected applications when it serves his purposes. He quarrels with the Supreme Court's holding that Congress lacks power under the Fourteenth Amendment to interpret what the Amendment prohibits in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507 (1997).
241. See Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1801, 1810-15 (2010).
242. The historical evidence of original meaning on which he relies, however, does not involve the original semantic meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement power, which does not obviously or unambiguously grant Congress interpretive power, see U. S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 5
243. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States...." U. S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1.
244. See Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., Abortion's New Battle Lines, N. Y. TIMES, May 1, 2010, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/01/opinion/01 blow.html.
245. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 147-54 (1973). The same is true of Professor Balkin's claim that the governmental interest in protecting life provides no sufficient justification for laws proscribing abortion on the ground that the law has not traditionally treated abortion as tantamount to murder.
246. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 522-27 (2007). Balkin makes no claim that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade government to erect barriers to the exercise of what were regarded as fundamental rights in the service of a sufficiently compelling governmental interest, nor does he claim that under the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the government must equate a practice to murder-even one involving what is thought to be a fundamental right-in order to proscribe it. Indeed, given that ptt-Roe abortion laws typically provided for sanctions less onerous than those imposed on murder, it is far from clear that the government must equate abortion to murder in order to proscribe it, at least based on the available historical evidence of what is regarded as a sufficient basis for government regulation. An argument that the government's failure to equate abortion with murder sufficiently undermines the strength of the government's interest in proscribing abortion may be persuasive, but it is not based on any historically fixed meaning of the privileges or immunities of citizenship.
247. This differs little from Justice Holmes's nonoriginalist formulation: "[C]ommerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business." Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 398 (1905). In other words, on Balkin's view, like that of Holmes, any nonoriginalist argument explaining that intrastate activity has some practical consequence for the interstate economy will fall within the commerce power. On this account, the original meaning of the Constitution's text is simply an invitation to supply evolving content as the understanding of the interstate economic effects of regulated activity evolves.
248. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 64-69 (1980). Balkin attempts an answer to this objection by claiming that that judicial review slows the process of constitutional change "until the change in constitutional culture proves lasting", and therefore "channels and disciplines present-day majorities through supermajoritarian rules that cannot easily change overnight (but can change eventually);
249. and Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 744-45 (2000).
250. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 44 (1997).
251. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 650-57 (1961).
252. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY L. J. 937, 969-85 (1983);
253. Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: "Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again", 74 N. C. L. REV. 1559, 1616-23 (1996);
254. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 369-72, 415-18 (2000);
255. Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 59-64 (1994);
256. Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 283-86 (1988);
257. Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CR. REV. 49, 53-68 (1981);
258. Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 394-423 (1999).
259. Cf. George C. Thomas III, Remapping the Criminal Procedure Universe, 83 VA. L. REV. 1819, 1837 (1997) (reviewing Amar, supra note 187) ("[I]t is not clear to me why inferring a civil remedy regime is a more satisfying Fourth Amendment construction than inferring the remedy of exclusion. The Amendment mentions neither remedy expressly. The historical pedigree of a civil enforcement model is admittedly better than that of the exclusionary rule, but civil enforcement has thorny problems that Amar ignores or minimizes." (footnote omitted)).
260. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1372 (2009).
261. To similar effect, see, for example, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 879-81 (2009);
262. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1081-82 (2005) (reviewing BARNETT, supra note 11);
263. "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian tribes..." U. S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
264. "The Congress shall have Power... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U. S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 18.
265. See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U. S. 1, 33-42 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
266. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U. S. CONST, amend. IX.
267. Jack N. Rakove, Conjuring withandfor-the People, 1 N. Y. U. J. L. & LIBERTY 660, 664-69 (2005) (reviewing BARNETT, supra note 11);
268. Douglas G. Smith, Does the Constitution Embody a Presumption of Liberty?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 328-37 (same).
269. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 51-233 (1996).
270. As Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent, "[b]y the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, there were at least 36 laws enacted by state or territorial legislatures limiting abortion. " Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 174-75 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
271. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 139-81 (1999).
272. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 19-29 (1985).
273. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 560-63 (1995). Others have argued that the original meaning of the Takings Clause was merely to require compensation for an exercise of the power of eminent domain.
274. See, e.g., Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the Original Understanding of the So-Called "Takings" Clause, 53 HASTINGS L. J. 1245, 1278-1301 (2002);
275. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L. J. 1077, 1119-24 (1993). At best, Professor Epstein may have described the original intended application of the Takings Clause, but even then, he does not explain why the concept of equivalent exchange-if indeed necessary to avoid the compensation requirement as consequence of the original meaning of the term "taken"-could not evolve if the public came to understand that other kinds of governmentally funded benefits, such as welfare or education, also provided important if difficult to quantify value to taxpayers by enhancing social stability.
276. Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1333, 1338 (1992).
277. See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due. Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315 (1999);
278. Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L. J. 585 (2009);
279. Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L. J. 408, 460-500 (2010).
280. DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE "SILENT" NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON'T KNOW THEY HAVE 21-44 (2007);
281. Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash's Majoritarian Difficulty: A Response to a Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 937, 940-54 (2008).
282. For a scholarly account consistent with Bork's view, see KURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 13-94 (2009).
283. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3085-86 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
284. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 57-91, 215-20 (1986).
285. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 342-51 (1985);
286. John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L. J. 1385, 1397-432 (1992).
287. Cf. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030 (plurality opinion) (declining to adopt petitioners' submission on the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause after observing that "petitioners are unable to identify the Clause's full scope. Nor is there any consensus on that question among the scholars...." (citation omitted)). I have elsewhere summarized what I regard as the confusing and conflicting evidence on the original meaning of this Clause.
288. See Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment: Original Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 361 (2009).
289. For arguments along these lines about the original meaning of the First Amendment, see Stanley C. Brubaker, Original Intent and the Freedom of Speech and Press, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 82, 88-89 (Eugene W. Hickok Jr. ed., 1991);
290. and Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L. J. 1, 26-32 (2011).
291. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation... and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 28-34 (2007).
292. U. S. CONST, art. II, § 1, c1. 1.
293. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2319-46 (2001).
294. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 83-93 (2009);
295. Robert B. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L. J. 963, 967-69 (2001);
296. Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 611-12 (1989);
297. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 597-99 (1984).
298. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 685-96 (1988).
299. For a more recent restatement of this position, adducing additional historical evidence of framing-era practice in the wake of the Constitution's ratification, see STEPHEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 30-122 (2008).
300. See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Politics and Tenure Powers in the Court, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1086-93 (1988);
301. Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 212-42 (1989);
302. Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L. J. 1725, 1755-1810 (1996);
303. Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 138-53 (1994);
304. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12-78 (1994);
305. see also Martin S. Flaherty, Relearning Founding Lessons: The Removal Power and Joint Accountability, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1563, 1568-71, 1588-93 (1997).
306. U. S. CONST, art. II, § 2, cl. [2].
307. See, e.g., Daiyl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2316-25 (2006).
308. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative - Arguments for the Unitary. Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 48-95 (1995).
309. Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (2011). Indeed, Professor Calabresi and a coauthor have written: "[T]he original meaning of a clause or text is [not] defined by the Framers' original expected applications.... [O]riginal expected applications are not enacted by the text, and legislators are often unaware of the implications of laws they enact. In so arguing, we agree with Yale law professor Jack Balkin. "
310. For yet another example of the inability of conservative semantic originalism to resolve constitutional disputes once original expected applications are cast aside, consider Professor Calabresi's criticism of the decision recognizing a right of consenting adults to engage in homosexual sex in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003). He argues that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause was to afford protection to fundamental rights deeply rooted in history, subject to reasonable exercise of the police power, and because these fundamental rights, as well as the proper scope of the police power, must be based on framing-era conceptions, the recognition of a right to homosexual sex is indefensible.
311. See Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court's Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L. J. 1097, 1108-15 (2004).
312. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723, 832-34 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
313. See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Sex, Lies and Jurisprudence: Robert Bork, Griswold and the Philosophy of Original Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV. 1045, 1070-82 (1990).
314. U. S. CONST, art. III, § 2.
315. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 309-16 (2008).
316. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 393-97 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
317. For illuminating reviews of historical evidence suggesting that in the wake of the framing, judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes was not invariably deferential, see William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 496-97, 517, 540-41, 560-62 (2005)
318. and Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L. J. 1257, 1325-28 (2009).
319. 541 U. S. 36, 38 (2004)
320. (quoting U. S. CONST, amend. VI).
321. 448 U. S. 56 (1980).
322. Crawford, 541 U. S. at 60-68.
323. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005).
324. Crawford, 541 U. S. at 53-56.
325. U. S. CONST, amend. V.
326. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old " Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1966)
327. reprinted in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSION: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 41, 41-68 (1980).
328. 384 U. S. 436 (1966).
329. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 447 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
330. Crawford, 541 U. S. at 51
331. (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 114 (1828)) (brackets in original) (emphasis added).
332. Crawford, 541 U. S. at 68-69.
333. See Harry M. Clor, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Balances of Constitutional Democracy, 25 RUTGERS L. J. 557 (1994);
334. Richard W. Gamett, Chief Justice Rehnquist's Enduring, Democratic Constitution, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 395 (2006);
335. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
336. 530 U. S. 466 (2000).
337. Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L. J. 657, 689 (2009);
338. Apprendi, 530 U. S. at 479-80.
339. (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 227, 247-48 (1999)).
340. See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L. J. 1097, 1124-32 (2001).
341. See Oregon v. Ice, 555 U. S. 160, 167-70 (2009).
342. Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 227, 244 (1999).
343. Apprendi, 530 U. S. at 481.
344. Apprendi, 530 U. S. at 481.
345. For a more elaborate analysis along these lines, see Jonathan F. Mitchell, Apprendi's Domain, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 297, 319-29.
346. Apprendi, 530 U. S. at 490 n. 16.
347. The same point emerged as the Court applied Apprendi to invalidate Washington's sentencing guidelines in Blakeley v. Washington, 542 U. S. 296 (2004). The Court held that even though the sentence in that case was within the statutorily authorized maximum, because it could not be lawfully imposed under the guidelines except on the basis of a factual finding made by the sentencing judge, it ran afoul of Apprendi.
348. 554 U. S. 570 (2008).
349. U. S. CONST, amend. II.
350. Heller, 554 U. S. at 577.
351. Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimialism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 246 (2008) (footnote omitted).
352. Heller, 554 U. S. at 627. The dissenters added that the first militia act, enacted in the same year that the Second Amendment was ratified, defined the militia as "every ablebodied white male citizen between the ages of 18 and 45" and required each "to 'provide himself with a good musket or firelock' and other specified weaponry."
353. (quoting Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271).
354. For a straightforward textual argument in favor of the position taken by the Court in Heller, see Nelson Lund, D. C.'s Handgun Ban and the Constitutional Right to Arms: One Hard Question?, 18 GEO. MASON U. C. R. L. J. 229, 236-40 (2008). There is, however, an argument that in the framing era, the phrase "bear arms" had a specifically military meaning, making the Second Amendment sufficiently ambiguous to warrant resort to the preamble.
355. See Heller, 554 U. S. at 646-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
356. Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: "Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss", 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1101-10 (2009).
357. Heller, 554 U. S. at 629.
358. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N. Y. U. L. REV. 375, 404-10 (2009);
359. See, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 138-44 (Oxford Univ. Press eds., 2000);
360. Saul Cornell, The Early American Origins of the Modern Gun Control Debate: The Right To Bear Arms, Firearms Regulation, and the Lessons of History, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 571, 581-85 (2006).
361. See C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can't Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 695, 698-728 (2009).
362. Heller, 554 U. S. at 631-34.
363. See, e.g., Carlton F. W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 1371, 1373-79 (2009);
364. See, e.g., Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1064-66 (2009);
365. Rory K. Little, Heller and Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism's Last Gasp, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 1415, 1427 (2009);
366. Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 198-99 (2008);
367. Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Perils of Compromise, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 429 (2009);
368. Adam Winkler, Heller's Catch-22, 56 UCLAL. REV. 9 1551, 1557-65 (2009).
369. See Heller, 554 U. S. at 634-35.
370. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U. S. 687, 708-21 (1999);
371. Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U. S. 558, 564-73 (1990);
372. Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U. S. 33, 40-65 (1989);
373. Tull v. United States, 481 U. S. 412, 417-27 (1987);
374. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189, 192-97 (1974).
375. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Originalism and Summary Judgment, 71 OHIO ST. L. J. 919, 928-32 (2010).
376. U. S. CONST, art. I, §§ 9, cl. 3, 10, cl. 1.
377. See, e.g., Stogner v. California, 539 U. S. 607, 610-16 (2003);
378. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U. S. 513, 521-30 (2000).
379. See William T. Han, Beyond Presidential Eligibility: The Natural Born Citizen Clause as a Source of Birthright Citizenship, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 457, 460-76 (2010).
380. N. Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349 (1921).
381. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
382. See Nelson Lund, Two Faces of Judicial Restraint (or Are There More?) in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 63 FLA. L. REV. 487, 496-500 (2011);
383. See, e.g., Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375, 384-91 (1982). Justice Thomas's separate opinion also involves a highly selective presentation of the pertinent historical evidence.
384. See Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, Colloquy Debate: McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 460-63 (2011). Indeed, the selective presentation of evidence in McDonald calls to mind the perils of "law office history", in which historical evidence of original meaning is assessed with an advocate's jaundiced eye that cherry-picks only the evidence supporting a predetermined conclusion.
385. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, The People's Constitution vs. the Lawyer's Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 295, 334-37 (2011);
386. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CR. REV. 119, 155-58;
387. Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387, 402-07 (2003);
388. John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 193, 197-204 (1993).
389. For what is likely the classic statement of this position, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 103-10 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1962).
390. See, e.g., Gregory Bassham, Justice Scalia's Equitable Constitution, 33 J. C. & U. L. 143, 154 (2006);
391. Robert Henry, Do Judges Think? Comments on Several Papers Presented at the Duke Law Journal'5 Conference on Measuring Judges and Justice, 58 DUKE L. J. 1703, 1709 (2009);
392. Jeffrey Rosen, Translating the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1998);
393. Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original Understanding of the Bill of Rights in 1866-67, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 1509, 1529 & n. 63 (2007);
394. R. George Wright, Originalism and the Problem of Fundamental Fairness, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 687, 688 & n. 11 (2008).