Rebooting originalism

University of Illinois Law Review

Volumn 2008, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 1185-1223

  Griffin, Stephen M ^a  

^a TULANE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 52049106873     PISSN: 02769948     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (287)

1. See Reboot (Fiction), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Reboot_(continuity) (last visited May 15, 2008); see also David M. Halbfinger, Pushing 'Batman' into New, Darker Directions, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 13, 2008, at 9; Alex Billington, Casino Royale: A Successful Bond Reboot, FIRST SHOWING, Nov. 18, 2006, http://www.firstshowing.net/2006/11/18/casino-royale-review-a-successful- bond-reboot/.
2. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620-29 (1999); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Pauken, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599 (2004).
3. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 87-152 (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 1-17 (1999); see also Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569 (1998); Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1127-33; Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327 (2002); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47 (2006); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism & the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996). For a useful reader on Originalism, see ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresied.,2007). For a distinctly different take on a "newer" Originalism, see the method of "text and principle" presented in Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 295-311 (2007). See also the symposium on Balkin's article and his response, Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Original Meaning].
4. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 3, at 89-100.
5. For reviews of objections to Originalism, see, for example, SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS (2007); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989); Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1997). For a recent critique of Originalism in the Court's federalism decisions, see EDWARD A. PURCELL JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A HISTORICAL INQUIRY (2007).
6. I will note this as appropriate below. Part of my motivation in writing this article is that the objections to Originalism I find most persuasive are not listed in many standard accounts. See, e.g.. sources cited supra note 5.
7. See, for example, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990) [hereinafter INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION], and the comprehensive bibliography concerning the debate in the 1980s and 1990s in Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1124 n.39. See also the discussion of the debate in JOHNATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 111-216 (2005).
8. See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 89-100 (focusing on Brest and Powell). But see WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 160-208 (detailed consideration of thirteen objections to originalism).
9. I borrow this term from debates in jurisprudence. See BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 47-50 (1996) (distinguishing between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism).
10. As the critique below implies, I assume the authors cited above are exclusive originalists (with the exception of Balkin). See supra notes 2-3. For an important recent critique of originalism that focuses on "strong" (exclusive) originalism, see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk (Working Paper, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1078933.
11. See BARNETT, supra note 3; WHITTINGTON, supra note 3.
12. See Whittington, supra note 2, at 604.
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. See Whittington, supra note 2, at 601-03.
15. Id. at 602.
16. See id. at 603.
17. Id. at 608.
18. See id. at 603-04.
19. See id. at 608-09.
20. Id. at 609.
21. See id. at 609-11.
22. For an important example that predates the new originalism, see Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723,725 (1988).
23. Barnett attributes this shift to advocacy by Justice Scalia. See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint- Hearted" Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989); see also Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 553-55 (2003).
24. See Whittington, supra note 2, at 610.
25. WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 6.
26. See id. at 50.
27. See id. at 50-61. I am bypassing the argument Whittington made for originalism based on the concept of popular sovereignty. See id. at 110-59.
28. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 551-59 (1994).
29. For a contrast, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
30. See BARNETT, supra note 3. I provided a review and critique of Barnett's book in Stephen M. Griffin, Barnett and the Constitution We Have Lost, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 283 (2005).
31. See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 345.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 103-05.
34. Id. at 105-06.
35. See id. at 89-100.
36. See id. at 89-90.
37. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 209-17 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
38. See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 94-100.
39. See, e.g., BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 5, at 79 n.1; Nelson, supra note 23, at 556-60.
40. Barnett has argued that Justice Scalia does not qualify, despite his well-known advocacy of originalism. See Barnett, supra note 23. Careful analyses of the opinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas have shown that they have not been able to follow originalism consistently. This means there is no consistent originalist currently on the Court (nor probably anywhere on the federal bench). See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATIVISM 256-68 (2004); Mark A. Graber, Clarence Thomas and the Perils of Amateur History, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 70 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003).
41. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 61-76; see also Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1126.
42. BARNETT, supra note 3, at 92.
43. See Michael D. Ramsey, Toward a Rule of Law in Foreign Affairs, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1450, 1473-74 (2006) (book review). Ramsey was reviewing JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005). For another recent example of the use of the originalist-nonoriginalist distinction, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 396 (2007).
44. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of The United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
45. Ramsey, supra note 43, at 1474.
46. See David Couzens Hoy, A Hermeneutical Critique of the Originalism/Nonoriginalism Distinction, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 479 (1988); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599 (1989). Hoy and Solum were criticizing the use of the distinction in MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988).
47. While they relied on Gadamer's henneneutical theory to make their arguments, their main point can be understood independently. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975).
48. See Hoy, supra note 46, at 497.
49. Id.
50. See Solum, supra note 46, at 1603-10.
51. See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 155 (1996).
52. Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 677 (1999).
53. See BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 5, at 99-101.
54. There is a recent work by a political scientist who defends nonoriginalism. See DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM (2005).
55. For a notable counterexample to the sources cited below, see Michael Dorf's complex and insightful article, Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765 (1997). I respond to Dorf's arguments below.
56. See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257,257-58 (2005); Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1134-48.
57. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
58. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
59. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
60. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT CONSTITUTIONAL FATE]; see also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL I NTERPRETATION (1991); Symposium, In Praise of Babbitt, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1703 (1994) (symposium on Philip Bobbitt's constitutional interpretation).
61. See GRIFFIN, supra note 51, at 143-52; Richard H. Fallen, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987); Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13 (1990). I would also place Laurence Tribe in this group. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 30-89 (3d ed. 2000).
62. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratexualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L, REV. 26 (2000) [hereinafter Amar, The Document and the Doctrine]; Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of Rights, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143 (1998); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996); see also Symposium, Textualism and the Constitution, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1081 (1998). Amar's project eventually resulted in AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005). For a good example of a transitional work in the 1990s, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993). Sunstein rejected originalism and advocated a common sense pluralistic approach without endorsing the originalist-nonoriginalist dichotomy. See id. at 93-122.
63. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS]; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; GRIFFIN, supra note 51; RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 282-87 (discussing the Clinton impeachment).
65. Not for the last time, I will make clear that when I say "originalism," I mean the position I defined as exclusive originalism.
66. See GRIFFIN, supra note 51, at 143-52.
67. See Dorf, supra note 55.
68. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 23, at 560-78.
69. For examples, see GRIFFIN, supra note 51, at 147.
70. I refer here to the process I have described as the " legalization" of the Constitution. See id. at 147, 206-09; see also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
71. See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 902-03 (2003).
72. See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 60, at 5-6; Dorf, supra note 55, at 1788-96.
73. Dorf, supra note 55, at 1794-95.
74. See id.
75. In the case of originalism or historical argument, see O'NEILL, supra note 7, at 2, 13; Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001 (1991). Dorf's discussion of "ancestral" and "heroic" originalism in Dorf, supra note 55, at 1800-10, is also suggestive.
76. Note that Whittington thinks most of these objections are flawed. See Whittington, supra note 2, at 605.
77. Id. at 605-06 (footnotes omitted).
78. The difficulties are acknowledged by new originalists. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 4, 209-11.
79. See LEGAL CANONS 413-22 (J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000).
80. See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 89; WHITTINGTON, supra note 3.
81. See discussion in GRIFFIN, supra note 51, at 157-58.
82. See KECK, supra note 40, at 270 (no justice has held that originalism is the only legitimate source of meaning). For a critique of the new originalism that concentrates on the reality that it is something of a moving target, see Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Originalism's Living Constitutionalism (George Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law Research, Paper No. 393, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1090282.
83. SEE, e.g., GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 1-7 (1992); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363-72 (1977); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 226-29 (1988); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 374-81 (1981).
84. See O'NEILL, supra note 7; Baade, supra note 75, at 1103-07.
85. See BASSHAM, supra note 83; O'NEILL, supra note 7, at 38 (quoting tenBroek).
86. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 114 (1988).
87. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
88. 17 US. 316 (1819).
89. 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
90. See the discussion in CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 181-214 (1996).
91. See Barron, 32 U.S. at 247.
92. See id. at 247-48.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
94. See Barron, 32 U.S. at 248-49.
95. See id. at 250.
96. For a recognition of this point by an originalist, see BORK, supra note 29, at 27.
97. For more contemporary examples of the use of different methods of interpretation, see, for example, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
98. See Stephen M. Griffin, The Age of Marbury: Judicial Review in a Democracy of Rights, in ARGUING MARBURY V. MADISON 104, 107-17 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005).
99. See J.M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 931-39 (1988) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDER'S DESIGN (1987)).
100. See the discussion in Monaghan, supra note 22, at 770-72.
101. See Baade, supra note 75.
102. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For insights on Brown and the arguments among the justices, see ROBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 290-312 (2004); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975); JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1994).
103. Jack Balkin comments: "Critics of the philosophy of original intention have pointed to Brown as a counterexample, arguing that the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment wanted only limited equality for blacks." Jack M. Balkin, Preface to WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID ix, xi (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) [hereinafter BROWN]. There has been a well-known debate on this score between Michael McConnell and Michael Klarman, with McConnell defending Brown as consistent with original meaning, although using evidence from the post-ratification period. See McConnell, supra note 3. Because Klarman approached the issue from a historicist perspective, he had the better case. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995).
104. See Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education - A Critical Introduction, in BROWN, supra note 103, at 3, 4.
105. See id. at 16.
106. See KLARMAN, supra note 102, at 303-07. As Justice Jackson's clerk, Barren Prettyman, put it: "[Warren's] opinion took the sting off the decision, it wasn't accusatory, and it didn't pretend that the Fourteenth Amendment was more helpful than the history suggested-he didn't equivocate on that point." Balkin, supra note 104, at 38. For a similar argument, see David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 299, 304-06 (2005).
107. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 72 B.U. L. REV. 747, 753-56 (1992) (by the time of Brown, Justice Frankfurter rejected original intent as a method of interpretation). Justice Frankfurter was a pillar of the legal establishment and it would be hard to explain how he could reject original intent if it was, as originalists claim, the sole legitimate method of interpretation.
108. 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 489-90.
111. Id. at 492-93.
112. See sources cited supra note 102.
113. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494; COTTROL ET AL., supra note 102, at 214.
114. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See the remarks on the reasoning of Brown in Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 361-63 (1987).
118. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 493-94.
121. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
122. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
123. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
124. Id. at 495.
125. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941-1953, at 685-93 (2006); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958,68 GEO. L.J. 1, 14-31, 43-44 (1979).
126. For an excellent example of a (mostly) textual argument in favor of Brown, see Amar, The Document and the Doctrine, supra note 62, at 60-66.
127. See KLARMAN, supra note 102, at 321-43.
128. See "Declaration of Constitutional Principles" [The Southern Manifesto], in PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 902, 903 (5th ed. 2006).
129. See O'NEILL, supra note 7, at 56.
130. See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1964); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). It would require a lengthy article to explain why such eminent jurists had trouble justifying Brown. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 33-37 (1996).
131. Balkin, supra note 104, at 71. The opinions Balltin solicited "rewriting" Brown support the idea that the opinion can be based on text and precedent alone. See the opinion of "Justice" John Hart Ely, Concurring in the Judgment (Except as to Remedy), in BROWN, supra note 103, at 135. For another favorable judgment on Warren's opinion, see COTTROL ET AL., supra note 102, at 177-80.
132. See Klarman, supra note 103, at 1919-20.
133. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
134. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
135. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
136. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
137. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
138. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
139. See GRIFFIN, supra note 51, at 143-52.
140. See, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828, at 221-45 (1999); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 224-34 (1993); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 340-65 (1996); WHITE, supra note 86, at 111-19; Nelson, supra note 23.
141. See, e.g., Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247 (1997). The rhetorical framing of the debate over constitutional interpretation as one of "fidelity" was unproductive because it was unavoidably biased in favor of originalism and anachronistic.
142. For discussion, see GRIFFIN, supra note 51, at 14; Stephen M. Griffin, Constituent Power and Constitutional Change in American Constitutionalism, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 49, 51-53 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007) [hereinafter Griffin, Constituent Power]; RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 89, 98 (1999).
143. There is evidence that the founding generation understood this point. See Larry Kramer's discussion of "popular constitutionalism." KRAMER, supra note 70, at 91.
144. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 140; RAKOVE, supra note 140.
145. The very idea of such abstract interpretation is criticized in Hoy, supra note 46, and Solum, supra note 46.
146. For a famous statement see Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 (1952).
147. For an important statement of this point, see STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 7-8 (2005).
148. See Balkin, supra note 99, at 953.
149. Again, I refer here to exclusive originalism.
150. For an important recent discussion, see G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485, 490-91 & n.8 (2002). White makes the useful point that "one can be a historicist without accepting the melioristic assumption that the path from the past to present to future is one of continuous improvement in the human condition." Id. at 491 n.8.
151. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 11 (1988).
152. Michael Les Benedict, Book Review, 10 LAW & HIST. REV. 377, 379 (1992).
153. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 63, at 34-66; GRIFFIN, supra note 51; KRAMER, supra note 70; Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in ModeRN American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE L.J. 2115 (1999) [hereinafter Griffin, Transformed], Michael J. Klannan, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996).
154. Indeed, one might refer to the dominant approach (shared by many theorists who do not count themselves originalists) as "nonhistoricism. " But I digress.
155. See Gordon S. Wood, The Fundamentalists and the Constitution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 18, 1988, at 33.
156. See his magisterial works: GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969) [hereinafter WOOD, CREATION] and GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992) [hereinafter WOOD, RADICALISM]; see also GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE FOUNDERS DIFFERENT (2006).
157. It is not my intention to discuss the accuracy of Wood's critique of the Straussians. I am appropriating his argument for my own purposes.
158. It is also worth noting that Wood wrote before an emphasis on "original meaning" became prominent.
159. See Wood, supra note 155, at 37-38.
160. Id. at 38; see also ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 140, at 5.
161. See Wood, supra note 155, at 38.
162. Id. at 39.
163. Id.
164. For this approach, see BARNETT, supra note 3, at 22-25. For criticism, see Griffin, supra note 30, at 290-92.
165. Wood, supra note 155, at 39.
166. Id. at 39-40.
167. Id. at 40.
168. Id. (quoting historian Frank Craven).
169. Id.
170. The critique of the originalist use of history by Wood and others may have been misread as claims that we cannot know with a reasonable degree of certainty what happened in the past See, e.g., Kay, supra note 83, at 251-53. In fact, Wood was saying nearly the opposite. Obviously it would be incongruous for a historian to claim that the effort to recover the past was fruitless.
171. See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 13-98 (2005). See generally WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 156.
172. For a critique of originalism that advances this argument, see Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529 (forthcoming 2008).
173. See sources cited supra note 140.
174. As Tom Keck observes: To the extent that the Reanquist Court's federalism revival has been rooted in fidelity to original meaning, then, it has been a 1789 version of original meaning that minimizes the constitutional change wrought during Reconstruction." KECK, supra note 40, at 264.
175. See, e.g., Griffin, Transformed, supra note 153.
176. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 196-98; William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7, at 23; Scalia, supra note 44, at 38-47; Wood, supra note 155.
177. For example, Justice Breyer's recent book does not mention it. See BREYER, supra note 147. For Brennan's approach, see Brennan, supra note 176.
178. This is explicit in Ackerman's recent Holmes lectures. See Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2007).
179. See id. at 1754.
180. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 63.
181. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001).
182. See GRIFFIN, supra note 51; Griffin, Constituent Power, supra note 142; Griffin, Transformed, supra note 153; see also Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998).
183. See Brennan, supra note 176, at 26-27.
184. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 63; ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 63.
185. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 63, at 40-50, 315-16.
186. See, e.g., Thomas P. Cracker, Envisioning the Constitution, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1,57-61 (2007); Ken I. Kersch, Everything Is Enumerated: The Developmental Past and Future of an Interpretive Problem, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 957, 974-75 (2006); Robert L. Tsai, Democracy's Handmaid, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2006).
187. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 63, at 359-77.
188. See id. at 255-78; see also Griffin, Transformed, supra note 153.
189. Brennan, supra note 176, at 27 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (Jackson, J.)).
190. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
191. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 338 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). See also the discussion in Griffin, supra note 51, at 29-30, 39-41.
192. As it did in the matter of the Twelfth Amendment.
193. The changes made during the New Deal are reviewed in the next section. See infra text accompanying notes 228-30.
194. For an extensive discussion, see GRIFFIN, supra note 51, at 36-46.
195. See, e.g., ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 140, at 50.
196. See Griffin, Constituent Power, supra note 142, at 53-56.
197. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 140, at 50-58.
198. See id. at 55-58.
199. See id. at 50-55.
200. See id. at 24.
201. See the discussion in id. at 308-73, 388-488, 643-62.
202. See id. at 590-93.
203. See id. at 719-26.
204. For a recent involving account, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005).
205. See WILENTZ, supra note 171, at 158-59,175-78; see also RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM (1969).
206. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 140, at 701-03.
207. See WILENTZ, supra note 171, at 4-5.
208. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, C ONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 12 (1999).
209. See Griffin, Transformed, supra note 153.
210. For relevant discussion, see KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (2004).
211. I have devoted considerable space to such a defense. See GRIFFIN, supra note 51; Griffin, Constituent Power, supra note 142; Griffin, Transformed, supra note 153.
212. See White, supra note 150, at 498-500; see also WHITE, supra note 86.
213. WHITE, supra note 86, at 360.
214. See id. at 741.
215. See, e.g., HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION (1990); BARNETT, supra note 3; CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW (1994).
216. See GRIFFIN, supra note 51, at 152-57.
217. Scalia, supra note 23, at 857.
218. Id. at 856.
219. See, e.g., JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMTTS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (1990).
220. See, e.g., White, supra note 150, at 526.
221. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 3, at 336-37.
222. See BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 5, at 45-55.
223. On the idea of balanced government as a goal of the founding generation, see ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 140, at 312-13.
224. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 140, at 6-7; WOOD, CREATION, supra note 156, at 606-15.
225. See Wood, supra note 155, at 38-39.
226. White, supra note 150, at 526.
227. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 54-55, 203-04 (1993).
228. See GRIFFIN, supra note 51, at 37, 81-86; Griffin, Transformed, supra note 153, at 2129-42; see also ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 63, at 255-78. For a careful review of the changes during the New Deal, see Monaghan, supra note 22, at 729-39.
229. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
230. See Griffin, Transformed, supra note 153, at 2134-35; see also GILLMAN, supra note 227, at 125, 193, 200-02.
231. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
232. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
233. See id. at 544-46.
234. See KLARMAN, supra note 102, at 10-23.
235. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551-52.
236. See KLUGER, supra note 102, at 573.
237. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
238. See the infamous comment in Plessy that if state segregation appears to place a "badge of inferiority" on African Americans, that is "solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." 163 U.S. at 551.
239. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93.
240. See id. at 490.
241. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
242. Here I employ the conventional chronology that the break with the past occurred in 1937. For a more complicated understanding of the New Deal period, see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998).
243. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). By post-Lochner I mean the post-1905. Progressive Era and after.
244. Barnett has some thoughts on this, but they are muddled. See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 204-05, 211. I criticize his account in Griffin, supra note 30, at 302-05.
245. There is no illumination on this point, for example, in O'Neill's recent history of originalism. See O'NEILL, supra note 7, at 28-36. But I think O'Neill is typical among originalists in seeing developments in the Progressive Era and New Deal almost exclusively in intellectual terms rather than focusing on political events and social movements. For a more sophisticated account of the intellectual history of the shift to the living Constitution, see White, supra note 150, at 506-21 (stressing the move from a prehistoricist to a historicist understanding of constitutional change in the early twentieth century).
246. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 208, at 12.
247. See id. at 9.
248. Id. at 6.
249. Id. at 5.
250. Id.
251. Whittington's detailed case histories of constructions include the impeachments of Judge Chase and President Andrew Johnson, the nullification crisis of 1832-1833, and President Nixon's impoundments. See id. at 17-18.
252. BARNETT, supra note 3, at 121.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 126.
255. See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 208.
256. Jack Balkin asserts that Whittington has done so in Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 9-10. However, Balkin does not demonstrate this. It may be that Balkin's method of "text and principle" can provide a legal justification for the changes made during the New Deal. In my view, it is doubtful that Balkin can square the New Deal in a historically sound way with the pre-New Deal framework of constitutional principles.
257. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 160-208.
258. See id. at 196-209.
259. I say "closest" because I do not rely on a number of the versions of the dead hand problem that Whittington refutes. For a version I do not find persuasive, see Klarman, supra note 5.
260. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 197-99.
261. Id. at 202.
262. Id.
263. Whittington does not consider a number of relevant discussions including GRIFFIN, supra note 51, at 28-46.
264. Here one might mention the decades it took to win approval of women's suffrage and the failure of the Equal Rights Amendment. Also, President Roosevelt's experience in the New Deal is relevant. See GRIFFIN, supra note 51, at 38.
265. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 201.
266. See Wood, supra note 155, at 39-40 (responding to originalist Walter Berns).
267. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 202.
268. See id. at 203.
269. See id. at 204-06.
270. Id. at 205.
271. Whittington does not discuss the New Deal, so it is hard to know how he would approach it from an originalist perspective.
272. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 153, at 554; Eric Foner, The Supreme Court's Legal History, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 243, 243 (1992); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 122; Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Uses of History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809, 811-16 (1997); William M. Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 227, 230 (1988).
273. Griffin, Transformed, supra note 153, at 2148-56.
274. See id. at 2149.
275. See id. at 2149-50.
276. On the influence of the Dunning school on the Court at the time of Brown, see WIECEK, supra note 125, at 655-56.
277. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at xix-xxvii (1988).
278. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
279. See WIECEK, supra note 125, at 519-21. Perhaps most scholars today would see the weight of history on Black's side. But for a nuanced (and not to be overlooked) recent summary of the evidence and analysis, see DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 27-36 (2003).
280. I refer to the controversy over Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See WIECEK, supra note 125, at 253-73.
281. See sources cited supra note 272.
282. I have called this context "the lens of constitutional change." See Griffin, Constituent Power, supra note 142, at 62-65.
283. I do not claim that historians or political scientists were prone to analyze the Clinton impeachment in this way.
284. See, e.g., Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998). But see id. at 45-57, 81-89 (testimony of Michael Gerhardt and testimony of Cass Sunstein) (referring to historical examples of past presidential impeachments). Gerhardt and Sunstein thus used a developmental analysis.
285. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
286. This is suggested by the account in WHITTINGTON, supra note 208, at 113-57.
287. See the prescient discussion in STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH 442-46 (1993).